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PREFACE 
One of the most neglected episodes in the history of 
post-war Asian international relations has been the invasion 
of Burma by the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) troops of 
Chiang Kai-shek and the enduring consequerices of this action. 
Beginning in 1950 and continuing for more than a decade, 
Kuomintang military operations had a maj•or impact on Burma's 
internal political life and foreign policy, with consequences
which are still operative. Indeed, the pattern and dynamics
of power in present-day Burma ,cannot be adequately appreci­
ated without an understanding of this phenomenon. 
Conceived in Washington as part of a grand strategy to 
contain the People's Republic of China, the plan to utilize 
remnants of Chiang's forces for the purpose of harassing and 
weakening the Peking government from bases wrested from the 
Burmese was an ignominious failure. These Kuomintang troops
had little stomach for the risks involved in military probes 
back into China and instead moved deeper into Burma, occupy­
ing and pillaging extensive areas. Modern U.S. military
equipment was airdropped to them in such quantity that they 
were able to provide many of these arms to Shan and Karen 
insurgents with whom they made tactical military alliances 
against the government of Burma. As a consequence, centrifu­
gal ethnic political forces in the country were significantly
strengthened. 
Although the CIA played a major role in this affair 
during both the Truman and the Eisenhower admini.strations,·
no substantial treatment of it appeared in the American press
until April 1966 when The New York Times included it in a 
general over-view of CIA activities. Moreover, Western 
studies of Asian international relations, ev�n those confined 
to Southeast Asia, have nearly all eschewed all but the most 
limited reference to this matter and have usually avoided any
reference to the CIA's pivotal role. The only exceptions
known to me aie Oliver Clubb Jr.'s brief (four pages}, but 
forthright, treatment in his United States and the Sino­
Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia, published in 1962, and his 
earlier Rand Corporation study dealin� with the 1950-1954 
period, "The Effect of Chinese Nationalist Military Activity
in Burma on Burmese Foreign Policy." But his accounts and 
that of The New York Times cover only a small part of the 
V 
story, with even Clubb's longer Rand Corporation study deal­
ing with just the beginning years. 
Continuing U.S. government secrecy has made it difficult 
to marshal! the data necessary for providing anything ap­
proaching a full account. Only investigation of a wide range 
of sources, research informed by an extensive knowledge of 
both modern Burma and Asian internatj_onal relations, could 
make possible fitting the many scattered pieces of pertinent 
data into a coherent and meaningful picture. This has been 
Robert Taylor's achievement in preparing this first compre­
hensive study of the nature and consequences of what the 
Burmese refer to as "The Kuomintang Aggression." 
Those who wish to understand the problems of contempo­
rary Burma as well as those interested in the facts of post­
war Asian international relations and American Far Eastern 
policy should be grateful to Mr. Taylor for his scholarly 
account of a development of major importance whose character 
and dimensions have until now been so obscured. 
George McT. Kahin 
Ithaca, July 15, 1973 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The intrusion of Chinese Nationalist troops into the 
Union of Burma, soon after Burma regained independence, posed
serious problems of internal and external security for the 
new government. These troops, normally referred to as the 
KMT,tl entered northern Burma from Yunnan Province following
their defeat by the army of the People's Republic of China. 
Internally, the primary problem faced by independent
Burma was the need to integrate into one state the five major
ethnic groups that composed the Union. These groups histori­
cally had had only tenuous ties with each other, and the four .
minorities distrusted the Burman majority. The intervention· 
of the KMT into the minority areas greatly increased the mag­
nitude of the problem of national unity and allowed the mi­
nority regions to become more powerful vis-l-vis the central 
government while increasing the minorities' - distrust of it. 
Both internal and external factors motivated the govern­
ment of Burma to pursue a neutralist foreign policy. Since 
different groups within Burma desired to support one or the 
other bloc in the Cold War, the government felt it necessary 
to _follow a neutralist policy in order to avoid antagonizing
either the pro-Western minorities or the pro-Soviet or pro­
Chinese communist groups. Burma is located between neutral­
ist India to the west, the People's Republic of China to the 
north, and war-torn Laos and pro-United States Thailand to 
the east. Situated in the middle of these states with dif­
fering ideologies and deep antagonisms, Burma has tried to 
remain on friendly terms with all of them. The existence of 
an anti-communist Chinese army on the borders with China, 
Laos and Thailand has made the maintenance of an independent
foreign policy increasingly necessary but increasingly diffi-
cult. 
The nations neighboring Burma and the United States have 
all displayed an interest in the KMT in Burma. The People's 
1. KMT are the initials of the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party. 
The Burmese and most other sources cited in this paper refer to these 
Chinese Nationalist troops as the "KMT." This usage will be followed 
in this paper. 
1 
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Republic of China obviously would not look favorably on an 
anti-communist army on its southern border. Thailand's anti­
communist foreign policy and historical distrust of Burma ex­
plains part of that government's interest in the KMT. The 
United States was actively involved in supporting the KMT in 
Burma. The actions of all of these governments have deeply
affected Burma's foreign and domestic policies. 
This paper is an attempt to describe the history of the 
KMT intrusion into Burma and to analyze the consequences of 
that intrusion on the domestic and foreign politics of Burma. 
An analysis of the effects of the KMT intervention must be 
rather speculative because of the nature of the available in­
formation and the difficulty of making causal links between 
activities and events. It is possible, however, to draw a 
general pattern of what the KMT and their supporters have 
done in Burma and what the response of the government of 
Burma has been. 
The sources used in this paper are those which are 
readily available in English. They are normally government
statements, documents and newspaper accounts or research 
based on these sources. The government sources, whether 
from Burma, the United States, Thailand or other countries, 
must be suspect as they have been made available by these 
governments normally for their own purposes. Newspaper ac­
counts are either themselves based on government supplied
information or on second-hand reports from usually unspeci­
fied informants. When different sources substantiate each 
other it is more likely that the information can be con­
sidered reliable. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
The Union of Burma is a multi-ethnic sta·te composed of 
five major ethnic groups. These are the Burmans, the Karens, 
the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins. Othir smaller groups
include the Mons, the Arakanese and the Karenni, and recently
immigrated Chinese and Indians. The Burmans, who compose 
more than 70 per cent of the total population, occupy the 
central interi9r of the country and the delta of the Irra­
waddy River. The other major groups live in the mountainous 
arch that encircles the Burman areas. Historically, the 
kings of Burma had governed these other peoples through their 
hereditary rulers who had been the king's vassals. It was 
only after the end of British rule that an attempt was made 
to include the non-Burman peoples within the framework of 
1the central government.t
The integration of the minorities into a national union 
has been difficult for several reasons. Among these are tra­
ditional antagonisms characterized by ethnic· chauvinism or 
racism. British administration did nothing to lessen these 
animosities and halted any indigenous efforts to overcome 
them. The British allowed the Frontier or Excluded Areas, 
as the minority areas were called, to remain essentially un­
touched in their political system and to be administered 
separately from the Burman areas.t2 
• 
1. John F. Cady, A HistoPy of Modern Bu.rma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1958), pp. 39-44; Josef Silverstein, ''Bunna," in 
Governments and Politias of Southeast Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin 
(2nd ed.t, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 
96-98. 
2. After Burma had been separated from India in 1937 and given a parlia­
mentary form of government within the Burman areas of the country, 
the Governor, who administered these areas without the advice of the 
Burman ministers, adopted a program intended "to raise them both in 
education and in material prosperity to a standard at least compara­
ble with that of their brethren in the plains and to enable them at 
some future time an equal place with the Bunnans in the development 
of British Burma.t" 
The Governor felt the division of the hill peoples from the Bur­
mans was justified because (1) the hill peoples lived primitive, 
3 
4 
The first constitution of Burma attempted to solve the 
problems of ethnic conflict by establishing subordinate state 
govern1nents for tl1e four largest minorities and the Karenni. 
The minorities were thus to obtain a degree of autonomy from 
the ethnic Burmans. As Tinker notes, this unique form of 
federalism was "a form of atonement for the age-old suspicion
of the Burmese which the hill peoples could not at once dis­
card."3 Four states were established plus a Special Division 
of the Chins.t4 The Constitution and related legislation
listed in detail the powers and rights of the states, includ­
ing the right of secession by the Shan State and the Kayah or 
Karenni State after 1958. In fact, however, the "federal 
structure was more nominal than real . . . t. "t5 For only a 
isolated lives and, excepting those who had served in the army, all 
were illiterate, (2) since they spoke no language but their own which 
were spoken only by small numbers of people in isolated valleys it 
was difficult to corranunicate with them, (3) there was "an inherited 
hostility between the men of the hills and the men of the plains. 
. . . The hillmen look down on the Burman as the descendant of a 
race whom his ancestors could raid and rob with impunity, while the 
Burman despises the hillmen and looks upon him as a wild and uncivi­
lized savage.t" Letter, Governor A. D. Cochrane to the Secretary of 
State for Bunna, the Marquess of Zetland, 15 March 1940, Burma Office 
File 1600/40 in the India Office Library and Archives. The group 
which most objected to Burmans being given a role in the governing 
of the hill areas was the Shan S(JJJ)bwas who as the hereditary rulers 
of the Shan States had the most to lose by the introduction of cen­
tral government rule in their areas. 
For a further discussion of some of the questions raised here, 
see Cady, History of Modern Burma, pp. 544-545; Kyaw Thet, "Bunna: 
The Political Integration of Linguistic and Religious Minority 
Groups,t" in Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, ed. by Phillip W. 
Thayer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 156-168; Peter 
Kunstadtert., "Introduction: Burma,t" in Southeast Asian Tribes, Minor­
ities and Nations, ed. by Peter Kunstadter (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967), Volume I ., p. 77. 
3. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Inde­
pendence (4th ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 30. 
British usage nonnally refers to the majority ethnic group as the 
Burmese as Tinker does in the above quotation. Following Silverstein, 
Burman is used in this paper in the ethnic sense and Burmese in the 
political sense, meaning all the citizens of Burma. Silverstein, 
"Burma, " p. 76, n. 1. 
4. The Karen State was fonned by Constitutional Amendment in 1951. 
5. Silverstein, "Burma," p. 119. 
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brief period were the minorities' suspicions of the Burmans 
lessened by the constitutional provisions.t6 
The neutralist foreign policy which Burma has pursued
has sometimes leaned toward the West and at other times to­
ward the socialist states. In the initial 'three years after 
independence Burma was linked rather closely to the West and 
especially with Great Britain. The Nu-Attlee Agreements,
signed in October, 194 7, provided for British advisors and 
material assistance to the new Burma army. Burma supported
the United Nations' actions in Korea and voted with the 
United States and other Western nations on seven of the first 
nine UN resolutions dealing with the Korean War. Burma ab­
stained on two resolutions. It was not until the United 
Nations passed a resolution branding the People's Republic 
of China an aggressor on January 30, 1951, that Burma clearly 
7rejected a pro-Western position. . 
Post-independence relations with Thailand and National­.
ist China were slow in developing. Diplomatic relations were 
not established with Thailand until approximately eight 
8months after independence.t Despite the fact that in their 
earlier wars Burma had always been the aggressor, many Bur­
mese were wary of Thailand because of the two countries' ear­
lier rivalries, because of Thailand's alignment with the 
United States after World War I I  and because of beliefs that 
Thailand might have designs of Burmese territory.t9 
Burma recognized the Nationalis� Chinese government of 
Chiang Kai-shek in 1948 but contacts between the two govern-
6. The relations of the Karens and the Shans to the central government 
are especially important for understanding the KMT intervention as 
the KMf occupied areas .primarily of Shan and Karen populations. For 
the Karens see Saw Hanson Tadaw,· "The Karens of Burma," Journa.l of 
the Burma Reseapch Society, 42 (1959), pp. 31-40; for the Shans see 
Josef Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan States: The Question of 
Secession from the Union of Burma," Journal of Asian Studies, 18 
(November, 1958), pp. 43-57. 
7. Isabelle Crocker, Burn7a's Foroign Policy and the Korean War: A Case 
Study (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1958), p. 55. 
\ . 
8. August 24, 1948. William c·. Johnstone and the Staff of the Rangoon­
Hopkins Center, A Chronology of Burma's Intema,tional Relations (Ran­
goon: Rangoon University, 1959), p. 12. 
9. In a survey, Burmese newspaper editors saw border problems with Thai­
land a grave threat to Burma's security. New York Times, April 28, 
1949. 
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ments were few. A local agreement was made between the Chi­
nese Nationalist commander in Yunnan, and Kachin and Shan 
chiefs in Burma, "for cooperation in suppressing banditry
and for mutual respect of the frontier.t"10 Although Burma 
demonstrated an initial apprehension of the Chinese communist 
government when it came to power in October, 1949, it was the 
first non-communist state to recognize the new government.
Nationalist China broke diplomatic relations with Burma the 
day after the People'ts Republic was recognized.11 Diplomatic
relations were not established with the Chinese People's Re­
public (CPR) until June 8, 1950.o12 
Although Burma initially voted with the West in the 
United Nations on the Korean War, the government made it 
clear that this did not mean that friendly relations were 
not to be maintained with all countries, including the CPR. 
In December, 1950, Burma joined with other African and Asian 
governments in the UN in an effort to resolve the Korean War 
through a proposal for a ceasefire and a conference on Asian 
problems.t13 
Burma did not show much interest in close ties with the 
United States, and presumably U.S. policy makers felt that 
Burma was primarily in the British sphere of interests. Al­
though Burmese officials met with United States Secretaries 
of State in 1948 and 1949, little appears to have resulted 
from these meetings.14 The United States may have offered 
in these meetings to assist the government of Burma in put­
ting down the insurgents then rampant in the country, but 
the government of Burma refused such offers of assistance.15 
In September, 1950, the United States agreed to grant eight 
to ten million dollars under the Economic Cooperation Admin-
10. Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958 (New 
York: Harper, 1958), p. 197. 
11. December 17 and 18, 1949. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 17. 
12. Ibid.t, p. 20. 
13. Ibid.t, p. 21. 
14. Ibid., pp. 13, 15. 
15. In 1967 U Thant told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the 
U.S. would have given Burma assistance "in 24 hours" to put down the 
communist insurgencies. A Conversation with U Thant, Seareta:ry Gen­
eral of the United Nations by Members of the Corrunittee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, Marah 22, 1967 (Washington, D.C.:  
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1. 
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istration to Burma for a ten-month period ending June 30, 
1951. At the same time, however, a U.S. arms aid mission 
left Burma off its itinerary because of signs it would not 
be welcome there.t16 The U. S. did send Burma t�n river pa­
trol boats in November, 1950.17 
Of primary concern to the government of Burma during
the years 1948-1951 was the civil war in Burma. The civil 
war itself was an important factor in shaping the neutralist 
foreign policy of Burma. The government was esstentially 
faced with two insurgencies. One in�urgent group favored 
alliance with the Soviet Union while the other supported 
closer ties with the West, including the United States. The 
government, caught between these two irreconcilable posi­
tions, attempted to compromise by not aligning with either 
•
maJor power. 
The civil war began in March, 1948, when the Communists 
resorted to arms against the government. Their motives were 
as diverse as their leadership but they posed a substantial 
threat to the new government. The Communists were soon fol­
lowed by the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) whtch was 
the para-military arm of the ruling Anti-Fascist People's
Freedom League. Most of the PVO's joined with the Commu­
nists. Dissident Karens, seeing the government's weakness 
in the face of the Communist-PYO revolts, also rebelled. 
Organized as the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO),
they sought greater autonomy within Burma if not existence 
as an independent state. The KNDO had contacts with British 
citizens and wanted the Burmese government to adopt a pro­
Western foreign policy. A small group of Moslems known as 
Mujahids and some Mons also revolted. 18 
Estimates vary as to the number of rebels during the 
civil war. Prime Minister Nu estimated in 1949 that there 
were 10,000 KNDO's and 10,000 Communist-PYO insurgents.19 
The map of p. 8 suggests the extent of rebel control in the 
first half of 1949. Gradually the Burma army was strength­
ened and the rebels were forced to retreat. Many surrendered 
to the government during periods of amnesty, and by 1950 it 
16. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 16. · 
17. "Military Assistance to .Burma,t" The Depm1tment of State Bulletin, 
23, No. 595 (November 27, 1950), p. 856. 
18. Tinker, Union, Chapter 2: "The Background of the Civil War, 1948-
1960,t" pp. 34-61; Cady, History of Modern Burma, pp. 578-605. 
19. Tinker, Union, p. 47. 
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appeared that the government would soon eliminate almost all 
pockets of resistance. The success of the army in great 
measure was due to its advantage over the rebels in arms and 
discipline. While the rebels had superiority in numbers, 
they never were able to coordinate their activities because 
of their differing goals and ideologies.t20 
Just as the government felt it could turn its attention 
from the problems of civil war to the tasks of national inte­
gration and economic construction, a new threat arose. The 
new threat was a remnant Nationalist Chinese Army fleeingt. 
from the victorious People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Yunnan 
Province into northern Burma. The new force possessed the 
two military.assets the Burmese insurgents had lacked, a 
good supply of arms· and discipline. 
20. Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
CHAPTER I I I 
THE KMT EMERGENCY, 1949-1954 
When the Communists achieved power in China in October, 
1949, they did not effectively control the area along the 
Burmese border. Largely mountains and jungles, this area is 
sparsely populated by various tribal groups who often strad­
dle the international border. These conditions provided the 
defeated KMT armies in Yunnan Province an excellent place to 
which to retreat. The Burma-China border was not clearly de­
fined or marked in many areas and the government of Burma, 
like the new government of China, had little control on its 
side of the boundary. Many of the KMT troops were reported 
to be natives of Yunnan and presumably some of them knew the 
border region well. 
According to Chinese sources, the People's Liberation 
Army did not enter Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, until 
February, 1950.t1 It can be assumed that it was several 
months after that before the PLA was able to penetrate the 
mountains of southern Yunnan. The KMT troops remaining in 
southern Yunnan resisted the PLA advance by conducting guer­
rilla harassment operations. The Chinese press later re­
ported that 
Following the peaceful liberation of Yunnan, remnant 
forces of the running dog of American imperialism, Bandit 
Chiang, instigated landlords and armed secret service 
agents to organize riots, murder cadres and seize grains 
and funds, availing themselves of the political vacuum 
existing at the time and the complicated national fron­
tiers and mountain terrain. They even formed bands of 
several thousand men and attacked and occupied our chu 
and hsiang govemments.t2 
1. Chen Tien, "Yunnan--China' s Gorgeous Frontier,t" Wen Hui Pao (Hong 
Kong), June 13 and 14, 1955, translated in United States Consulate­
General, Hong Kong, Survey of the Current Mainland Press (SCMP), 
1092, p. 39. 
2. Kunming Yunnan Jih Pao, March 4, 1954, in ibid.t, 783, supplement, p. 
xix. 
10 
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'f'h is indicates that the CPR was not able to control effec­
tively the border region for some time and the KMT was able 
to organize resistance to the government. Land reform and 
other campaigns in the border areas were usually two or more 
years behind the rest of China because of the lack of govern­
ment control and the desire not to alienate the minority 
peoples from the new government. As late as July, 1950, re­
ports from Saigon indicated that 4,000 KMT troops already in 
Burma were returning to Yunnan to carry on guerrilla warfare. 
They had been dissuaded by French officials from enteringt· 
Indo-China.t3 As the PLA advanced further into southern 
Yunnan, more KMT's entered northern Burma.t. 
During most of 1948 the government of Burma showed 
little concern over the activities of the Chinese on the 
northern border. There was one report of clashes between 
government of Burma troops and Chinese guerrillas.t4 . Late in 
the year Prime Minister Nu, in a broadcast speech, noted that 
Chinese refugees were "pouring over the border" from Yunnan. 
He suggested that this posed a threat to the peace of Burma 
and apparently felt that among the refugees might be Commu­
nists sent to infiltrate the country.t5 
The government of Burma reported that in April, 1949, a 
force of 2,000 Chinese "army deserters" apparently from Yun­
nan entered the Kengtung area of the Shan State and burned 
Shan villages.t6 A survey published by Bur�ese newspaper edi­
tors stated that "armed Chinese bands" were "roaming at will 
over three-fifths of Kengtung.t"t7 Organized KMT units, ac­
cording to the Sawbwa of Kengtung, passed through his state 
in early 1949 on their way to join the Free Laos Movement in 
neighboring Inda-China, but they were defeated by the French 
and returned to Yunnan.t8 . .  
An organized unit of approximately 200 KMT's entered 
Kengtung State ·in January, 1950. They were joined in March 
by 1,500 troops who brought with them 500 dependents.t9 The 
3. New York Times, July 13, 1950. 
4. Ibid., April 9, 1948. 
5. Ibid., December 6, 1948 .. 
6. Ibid., April 11, 1949. 
7. Ibid., April 28, 1949. 
8. Ibid., March 31, 1950. 
9. Union of Bunna, Ministry of Information, Kuomintang Aggression Against 
Burma (Rangoon, 1953), p. 9. 
12 
KMT's who entered Burma were members of the Eighth Army com­
manded by General Li Mi, the 26th Army under General Liu Kuo 
Chwan and the 93rd Division under Major-General Mah Chaw Yu.t10 
The 93rd had been forced from Burma by the Japanese during 
World War II.t11 None of these units had made great records 
of military accomplishment either in World War II or during
the Chinese civil war.t12  
The Burma army had interned some of the first KMT troops 
who had entered Burma but later arrivals refused to submit 
to the Burmese. The KMT commander in Kengtung, in June, 
1950, demanded that the Burma army release the interned KMT's, 
and he announced he would attack if the Burma army attempted 
to capture his men.t13 The KMT had established a headquarters. 
at Tachilek and were attacked there by the Burma army in 
July, 1950. By then their total strength had increased to 
2,500 men.t14 General Li Mi established a new headquarters 
at Monghsat in late 1950 and recruited more troops from Chi­
nese and Shans on the border. Most of the Shans had to be 
bribed or threatened into joining. By April, 1951, the KMT 
had increased to 4, 000. 15 The government of Burma reported
that 100 Nationalist Chinese troops arrived in Kengtung in 
late 1950 to organize three training camps.t16 Diplomatic 
sources in Rangoon reported that Chinese volunteers from 
Malaya, Thailand and Burma were joining the KMT and that they 
were being supplied daily by air from Thailand.t17 By mid-
1951, the problem was becoming more serious for the Burma 
government. The KMT had spread further west and crossed the 
Salween River to prey on villages there.18 
10. Tinker, Union, p. SO. 
11. New York Times, March 13, 1950. 
12. Maung Maung, Grim War Against the KMT (Rangoon: Private Printing, 
1953). 
13. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 9, Exhibit document 1, pp. 139-141. 
14. Tinker, Union, p. 52. 
15. Ibid.; Tibor Mende, South East Asia Between Two Worlds (London: 
Turnstile Press, 1955), p. 148. 
16. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 9. 
17. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 23. 
18. Cady, History of Modem Burma, p. 621. 
13 
24. 
In January, 1952, reports indicated that well-armed KMT 
troops "were moving daily from Formosa, through Thailand to 
join General Li's army . . o. .  "19 Their strength had increased 
to at least 8, 000 men in Burma20 and many of the troops were 
armed with United States-made w�apons.o21 . The Thai policeo_
arrested a Chinese newspaper editor in Bangkok for recruiting 
Chinese Thais to join the KMT.o22 
Estimates of the total number of KMT's v�ry but the New  
York Times reported that there were 12,o000 KMT's in Burma by 
February, 1952.o23 Nine hundred more arrived from Formosa in 
late February.o24 By March1 1953, it was reported that 30,o000 
KMT's were on the border.o2 ::, General Li Mi claimed to command 
30,o000 troops.o26 
As noted above, the KMT were being supplied by air drops 
in 1951. C-46 and C-47 transports flew supplies in at least 
twice a_ week.o27 By March, 1952A planes were landing supplies at a KMT airfield at Monghsat.o2 
The KMT were also_ supported by banditry and opium smug­
gling. They monopolized the Shan opium trade and used the 
revenue to buy guns in Thailand. A Chinese, posing as a mer­
chant, but probably a KMT officer, conducted an opium for 
guns business in Chiengmai.o29 
19. New York Times, January 29, 1952. 
20. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 26. 
21. New York Times, January 29, 1952. 
22. Ibid., February 2, 1952. 
23. Ibid., February 11, 1952. 
Ibid., February 22, 1952. 
25. Ibid., March 3, 1953. 
26. Time, 61, No. 20 (May 18, 1953), pp. 30-31. 
27. Burma, Kuorrrintang Aggression, pp. 10-11, 15. 
28. Ibid., p. 15. 
29. New York Times, March 9, 1952; Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Chronology of International Events and Documents (London), 
No. 9, p. 216; "The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Burma," 
The Atlantia Monthly, May 19, 1954, p. 6. 
14 
In their first few years in Burma, the KMT launched .
several attacks and border raids on the Chinese Communists 
in Yunnan. They were never successful and were always driven 
back by the PLA. Once in early May and again in July, 1951, 
major offensives were attempted.t30 Assaults were also at­
tempted in August, 1952,o31 and again in January, 1953.o32 In 
the last effort the KMT were badly routed. Reports indicated 
that only 20 per cent of the 30,000 troops involved in vari­
ous operations returned from Yunnan.t33 Following this ef­
fort, the KMT apparently concentrated their efforts on con­
trolling the border with China and took the border post of 
Kyotkok, opposite Wan-t'ting in Yunnan, from the Burma army.t34 · 
The Burma army was soon able to retake the post, however. 3 5 
According to the government of Burma, the KMT also 
attempted to create border incidents which would have caused 
Burmese and PLA troops to fight each other. The KMT would 
post as either Burma Army or PLA soldiers and attempt to 
draw fire from one side onto the other. Incidents of this 
nature were reported to have occurred on August 26, September 
14, December 23, 1951, and January 23, 1952.36 The• Burma 
army and PLA commanders apparently did not fall for these 
ploys. KMT units also fought each other.37 Some had report­
edly been infiltrated by Communists but hostility may have 
developed over opium collection and other activities. 
By 1953 the KMT virtually occupied Kengtung, Manglun
and Kokang States in the Shan State. The map on page 15 
illustrates the extent of KMT domination. They had forced 
the administration of the government of Burma to flee the 
area and had themselves assumed the functions of de facto 
government, including tax collection. They built over one 
hundred miles of road, seventy in Burma and thirty in Thai-
30. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, pp. 13-14. 
31. Ibid., p. 14. 
32. Nation, February 15, 1953. 
33. New York Times, March 2, 1953. 
34. Bangkok Post, February 20 and 23, 1953. 
35. Ibid., February 25, 1953. 
36. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 15. 
37. Nation, February 22, 1953. 
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lan d . t3 8  The KMT, according to the government of Burma, even 
issued calls for the Burmese to overthrow the central govern­
ment. 3 9 
The KMT entrance into northern Burma prolonged the civil 
war and disrupted efforts toward ethnic integration and eco­
nomic and political development. The activities of the KMT 
had four negative effects on the ability of the government 
to end the insurgencies and unify the nation. First, the 
KMT intervention required Burma troops to be moved to the 
north. Second, the KMT increased the supply of arms and 
ammunition available to the insurgents. Third, the KMT'ts 
depredations demonstrated the inability of the government to 
protect the people, which in turn weakened their loyalty to 
it. Fourth, the concentration of government troops in the 
Shan State resulted in increased distrust of the Burmans by 
the Sh ans. 
Before the KMT entered Burma it appeared that the govern­
ment would soon be in control of all the country. In 1949 
the government had gone on the offensive and the rebels, both 
the Communist- PVO's and the KNDO's, were retreating. During
1950 and 195 1, the government slowly consolidated its control 
and carried on a "slow process of attrition" against the 
rebels.t4 0  When the government diverted its limited forces 
against the KMT, the rebels were again able to take the 
offensive. To cope with the KMT, over 25,t0 0 0  Burma army
soldiers were sent north. This left less than 20,t0 0 0  troops 
to face the various insurgencies.t4 1  As the figures in Table 
I suggest, the army was able to reduce further the number of 
rebels after the KMT entered, but none of the groups was 
eliminated as had been expected. 
Initially the KMT kept to themselves within the Shan 
State and did not collaborate with the other anti-government
forces. In late 1951, however, they began to turn their 
attention away from Yunnan and toward Burma. They first col­
luded with and sold weapons to the Karen National Defense 
42Organization.t In January, 1952, the government of Burma 
38.  Ibid. 
39. These claims are documented in Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, espe-
cially pp. 16-18 and documents in the appendix. 
40. Tinker, Union, p. 48. 
41. Mende, South East Asia Between Two Worlds, pp. 148-149. 
42. Cadyt, His_tory of Modern Burma, p. 621; Nation, January 23, 1953. 
17 
43. p .  
p. 
45. 
Table  I 
Ins urgents in Burma, 19 51 and 19 53 
December, 19 51 April, 19 53 
BCP ( Communis ts)  
·Red Fl ags (Communists )o
PVO's 
KNDO's 
Mujahoids 
KMT's 
Total 
6 , 0 0 0  4, 0 0 0  
1, 800 600  
15,o000  4, 0 00 
12, 000  3, 7 00 
2, 000  300  
7, 0 0 0  12, 0 0 0  
43 , 000  24 , 6 0 0  
Source: Nation ,  April 16, 19 53. 
reported 10 0 KMT's had es tablished contacts with the K ND0.o4 3 
The next month Saw Shwe, a B rigadier in the K NDO, reportedly 
traveled to Bangkok t o  meet with General Li Mi.o4 4  By mid­
year a l oos e al liance had been formed between the K NDO and 
the KMT. 4 5 In Augus t, KNDO l ead.ers met with KMT official s 
in Chiengmai to arrange arms aid.o4 6  In April, 19 53, the 
Rangoon Nati on reported a captured l etter from Major- General 
Saw Ohn Pe, th � l eader of the KNDO delegation, to  General Li 
Mi's headquart ers, dis cus s ing "European instructors for the 
training of students . " 4 7  
Although the init ial KMT aid t o  the KNDO had been l im­
ited to weap ons and advis ers,o4 8  by February, 19 53, combined 
bands of KMT's and KNDO's were fighting together. The KMT'so. 
were rep orted to  be wearing KNno· uniforms .o4 9 On February 9 
a j oint group of 300  attacked Loikaw in the Karenni State.os d  
Kuomintang Aggression, 1 1 .Burma, 
Ibid., 19.44. 
Tinker, Union, p .e. 52 . 
46. New York Times, August 26,  1952. 
47. Nation, April 1 ,  1953 .  
. . 
48. New York Times, January 17, 1953. 
49. :Nation, February 1 and 16, 1953. 
SO.  New York Times, February 1 0 ,  1953 .  
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In March combined units were attacking within 1 0  miles of 
Rangoon.t5 1  In  April, a combined group of 2,o500 KMT's and 
KNDO's launched an attack from Thailand on the Moulmein area, 
350 miles south of Kengtung. A Reuters dispatch said the 
attack ,vas part of an effort to remove pressure on the Keng­
tung area by Burma army troops and to open a port to get
supplies by ship from Formosa.t52 Combined units were found 
within 80 to 1 50 miles of Rangoont-in August, September and 
November of 1 953o.o5 3  
A variety of factors made a KMT-KNDO alliance useful 
for both groups. Both found the neutralist foreign policy
of Burma unsatisfactory. Both looked to the West for aid. 
Collusion between the two forces also brought together their 
differing resources so that both could be more effective 
against the army. While the KMT had weapons and other mili­
tary supplies, the KNDO had contacts with the population in 
some areas and had easier access to food supplies. 
The various groups of communist rebels benefited from 
the KMT intervention. When the Burma army launched assaults 
against the KMT in July, 1950, and during the Autumn of 1 951 , 
the Communists were able to advance.t5 4  The Burman Communists 
apparently had established "joint operational commands" with 
the KNDO in late 1 952.o5 5  The Communists were probably re­
ceiving United States-made weapons from the KNDO which 
received them from the K1'1T. Prime Minister Nu believed this 
to be the situation.t5 6  Others stated that the Communists 
were getting arms directly from the KMT.t5 7  
51. Bangkok Postt, March 20, 1953. 
52. New York Times, April 21, 1953. 
53. Ibid.t, August 17 and September 4, 1953. William C. Johnstone, 
Burma's Foreign Policy : A Study in Neutralism (Cambridge, Mass.t: 
Harvard University Press, 1965),  p. 321. 
54. Tinker, Union, pp. 50, 52. 
55. Nation, January 23, and February 10, 1953. 
56. Ibid.t, March 31, 1953; "Chinese Kuomintang and Burmese Communists 
Are Friends," The GUOPdia:n (monthly), Vol. I, No. 3 (January, 1954) , 
pp. 22-23. 
57. Statement by U Ba Swe, the Burmese Minister of Defense, in Johnstone, 
Chronologyt, p. 31; Mende, South East Asia Between TWo Worlds, p. 
168. 
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Whatever the precise details, it seems apparent that 
the KMT did increase the quantity of weapons available to 
the antit-government forces, and, as a result, improved those 
forces' position vis- � -vis the Burma army. The net effect 
was to decrease the government's control of the rebel areas, 
expand the area of rebel activity and strengthen the rebels' 
belief that they could defeat the government. 
The KMT attempted an alliance with the Sawbwas of the 
Shan State. They appeared to champion their cause against
the central government but the Sawbwas did not join with 
tl1em. 5 8  Silverstein has suggested the KMT intervention may
have temporarily strengthened the desire for Shan unity .in 
the Union.t5 9  In the long run, however, the KMT intervention 
had a negative effect on Shan-Burman relations. The large
number of Burman troops in the area, and the imposition· of 
martial law in 22 of the 33 Shan States because of the KNDO' s 
and the KMT' s,t6 0  increased the antagonisms of the Shans to­
ward the central government.t· When, in 19 5 8 ,  Shan separationt­
ist feelings were on· the increase, the negative experience 
of the army'ts rule was an additional argument for greater 
autonomy. 
The government of Burma had adopted a mildly socialist 
economic policy which was intended to reconstruct the war­
destroyed economy, raise the standard of living of the 
people, and convince the leftists that the government was 
not a tool of foreign capitalists and that they did not need 
to resort to arms to accomplish economic reforms. Because 
of the civil war and its extension as a result of the KMT 
intervention, economic· development was set back.t6 1  Land re­
form, a key aspect of the government program to gain peasant 
support, was not implemented to a large extent until 1954 
even though it had been planned in 1948.t6 2  
In 1952 the_ government spent approximately 40 per 
58. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 18. 
59. Josef Silverstein, "The Struggle for National Unity in the Union of 
Burma" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 
1960), p. 401. 
60. Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan State,t" p. 51. 
61. Cady, History of Modern Burma, p. 624 . 
62. Charles A .  Fisher, Southeast Asia: A Soaial, Eaonomic and Politiaal 
Geography (London: Metheun and Co.t, Ltd.t, 1966), p. 415. 
2 0  
cent of its revenue on internal security.t63  In 1 9 5 4 ,  after 
the KMT problem had lessened, the govetrnment sti l l  budgeted
28 per cent of its expenditure for anti- rebel activity.t6 4  
While not all  of this expenditure was the direct result of 
the KMT intervention, a large portion was. 
In the eastern Shan State, especial ly near Kengtung, 
consumer prices increased rapidly when Thailand closed the 
border between Chiengmai and Kengtung city because of Burma 
Army-KMT military activity on the border.t6 5  Much of the 
trade of Kengtung was with northern Thailand. The loyalty
of the Shans to the central government was precarious in any 
case, and this economic hardship imposed on them, along with 
the depredations of the KMT and the Burma army, did not im­
prove relations between the central government and this re­
gion. Also, the termination of United States economic aid, 
discussed below, delayed or forced the abandonment of a num­
ber of projtects designed for economic and social develop­
ment. 6t6 In summation, the KMT intervention forced the gov­
ernment to delay its ambitious economic programs, and, as a 
resu lt, it was less able to convince the Burmese, regardless
of ethnic background, that the government deserved their 
loyalty. 
Among the political elite in Rangoon, there was little 
disagreement on how to handle the KMT intervention during 
the 1 9 5 0- 19 5 4  period. The Anti-Fascist Peop le' s Freedom 
League held a large majority in the legislature and the 
elite, including the army , apparently supported U Nu's ef­
forts to solve the problem. The leading critic of the 
government'ts handling of the crisis was the smal l Burma 
Worker'ts and Peasant's P�rty. It offered in November, 1 9 5 2 ,
' 
to organize a private army to rout the KMT but the govern-
ment turned down the offer. 6 7 The Communists and PVO rebels 
also offered to join the govetrnment in attacking the KMT but 
63. New York Herald Tribune, March 31, 1953. 
64. New York Times, April 23, 1955. 
65. Tinker, Union, p. 359. 
66 . Ibid., p. 106. 
67. Cady, History of Modern Burma, p. 622 n. 1 ;  see also Virginia 
Thompson and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia 
(Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 25; Geoffrey Fair­
bairn, "Burma and the ' Cold War, ' "  Australian Outlook, 6 (Septem­
ber, 1952), pp. 147-148; Fifield, Diplomacy , pp. 2 02-203; Nation, 
March 6, 1 953. 
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on terms which the government would not accept.6 8  Presum­
ably they wanted amnes ty, weapons and Buima ' s  al ignment with 
the Communi st  bloc. 
From 1950  to March 1 9 5 3, the government attempted to  
so lve the problem through m i l i tary means and by negotiat ing 
with Nat ional i s t  China for the KMT ' s  internment or evacua­
tion through the good offices of the United States and India. 
Mi l i tary efforts by the government of Burma agains t the 
KMT extended from 19 50 . to the 1960 ' s, but the discus s i on 
here wi l l  be l imited to the period from 1950  to  September, 
1 9 5 4, the end of the first evacuation of the KMT ' s  to For ­
mosa . The Burma army had attempted to intern the KMT when 
they first began to enter Burma. The first few were interned 
but they later escaped and spl it  into sma l l  bands.69 After  
i s suing an ultimatum . to the KMT that they e ither surrender 
the i r  arms or l eave the country, the Burma army in Kengtung 
launched its  first  maj or operat ion agains t the KMT in June, 
1 9 50. 7 0  By July i t  appeared the attack had been succes sful 
as the KMT were reported to be re treat ing into Yunnan . 7 1  The 
army was able to secure the Kengtung- Tachilek road and to 
take Tachilek from the KMT. 7 2  · 
Wi th the ces sat ion of maj or mi l i tary operations the KMT 
we re able to return to  Burma and resume thei r
r 
act ivities  . 
The Burma army launched a s econd attack on them, known as 
"Operat ion Frost, " in November, 1 9 5 1 . ?  3 Addit i onal efforts 
were made to rout the KMT during 19 52,  7 4  but apparently be ­
cause of the increased s trength of the KMT the confl ict was 
s talemated. In February, 1 9 5 3, the army launched another 
maj or campaign agains t the KMT, 7 5  but by early March they 
68. Fifield, DipZomaay, p. 203. 
69. New York Times, July 6, 1950. KMT troops which had entered French 
Indo-China had been interned in accordance with international law. 
Between 1949 and rnid-1950 between 55,000 and 60,000 were interned 
by the French. Ibid.,  June 15 , 1951. 
70. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 9. 
71. New York Times, July 11, 1950. 
72. Ibid.,  September 9, 1950; Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 9. 
73. Ibid., p. 10 . 
74 . Johnstone, Chronology, pp. 25, 27. 
75. New York Times, February 17 and 25, 1953. 
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were spread more widely than they had ever been. 7 6  By this 
time, according to Burmese sources, the KMT had ample weapons
and ammunition plus new Dodge and Ford trucks. The concen­
tration of equipment was the "largest Burma had ever seen. "t7 7  
The government offensive continued into March , in an 
effort to form a pincer to force the KMT back into Yunnan.t7 8  
A monitored radio command ordered the KMT to retreat east of 
tl1e Salween River. It was reported that the KMT were "rush­
ing supplies and ammunition from Thailand to consolidate and 
"t7 9hold at all costs their positions in Kengtung State.t
Although Burmese sources indicated the KMT's were retreating
from Monghsat in March,t8 0  they were still located there in 
early April.tB l  
This flurry of military activity in February and March 
was possibly in response to an increase in KMT activity in 
January, but it was also probably designed to coordinate 
with the plan of the government to take its complaint against 
Nationalist China to the United Nations General Assembly in 
late March. It might have been intended also to convince 
the KMT that they would have to leave Union territory or 
face constant military harassment. 
The government of Burma in 1951 requested I ndia and the 
United States to use their good offices to assist in getting 
Nationalist China to evacuate the KMT. Burma had originally 
planned to take the problem to the UN General Assembly in 
195 1 but was dissuaded from doing so by United States diplo­
mats in Rangoon who proposed using U. S. good offices first.t82 
The U.tS. Ambassador at that time, David McK. Key, and later 
his successor, William J. Seband, attempted to get the State 
76. Tinker, Union, p. 53. 
77. Nation, March 5, 1953. The Burma air force bombed the KMT headquar­
ters at Monghsat on February 26, 1953. New York Times, February 27, 
1953. 
78. Ibid.t, March 8, 1953. 
79. Ibid., March 17, 1953. The Bangkok Post reported that the order was 
for the KMT to spread out and stand firm. March 17, 1953. 
80 . New York Times, March 15 , 1953. 
81. Ibid.t, April 7, 1953.  
82. Frank N. Trager, Note 7a, pp. 1216-1218 of Burma, ed. by Frank N. 
Trager (New Haven, Conn.  : Human Relat ions Area Files, 1956, 3 vol-
unes). 
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,. � . 
Department to pressure the Nationalist Chinese government 
but their efforts received li ttle response in Washington.o8 3  
As Indi a had li ttle influence in Taipeh and the U. S. govern­
ment applied no pressure on the Nationalist government, 
these di plomati c attempts to find a solution to the KMT prob­
lem failed. Burma finally turned to th� Uni ted Nati ons Gen­
eral Assembly in March, 1 9 5 3 .  
On March 2, 19 5 3 ,  Pri me Minister Nu made a major speech 
on the KMT in the Burma legi slature. In i t  he announced the 
deci si on of the government to ask the Uni ted Nati ons to label 
Nati onalist China an aggressor against Burma and to assist 
Burma ino_osolving the KMT problem. In the speech he outlined 
the three options the government felt i t  had. These were:  
(1) To take the matter to the United Nations Organization; 
(2) To negotiate with the Chinese National Government in 
Formosa, through the good offices of those governments 
which have diplomatic relations with it, with a view to 
the withdrawal of the KMT forces from the Union terri­
tory ; 
(3) To counter-attack the KMT aggressors by the armed 
forces of the Union.t84 
U Nu stated that opti ons ( 2) and ( 3 )  had been· attempted and 
had failed. Reluctantly, therefore, Burma was forced to take 
the first alternative.oB S 
Previ ously, Nu said, Burma had not ·e�erci sed opti on ( 1) 
for three reasons. First, the government feared that " the 
·Chinese Nati onalist Government [ might] flatly repudioate i ts 
own responsibi li ty for the KMT forces . . .  by declaring 
that they are deserters from the Nati onali st forces . . . o. 1 1  8 6  
I f  this were to happen, Burma would have no other recourse 
than to attempt a mili tary soluti on as the . UN would have no 
jurisdi cti on in the matter. Second, " .  . . the Chfnese 
83. Ibid.  ; see also Frank N. Trager, Patricia Wohlgemuth and Lu-Yut. Kiang, 
Burma 's Role in the United Nations, 1948- 1955 (New York: Institute 
for Pacific Relations, 1956), p. 10. The New York Times reported 
that "it appears that the State Department is merely passing on the 
Burmese Government's complaint rather than urging General Chiang'ts 
Government to take action.t" May 16, 1951. 
84. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 1. 
85. The Bangkok Post reported on March 12, 1953, that Prime Minister Nu 
had been very reluctant to take the KMf matter to the UN. 
86. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 1. 
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Nationalist Government [migh t ]  _come out with more blatant 
assertions that the so-called KMT forces in Burma are in 
fact soldiers of the People's Republic of China wearing KMT 
uniforms."t8 7  Third, Nu stated, 
Since the KMT aggressors are also enemies of the People ' s  
Republic of China, the latter will  naturally take a keen 
interest in this matter. Therefore , wil l  the step or 
steps taken by the United Nations antagoni 'ze the People ' s  
Republic of China and make the present simple case of 
aggression a much more complicated issue?88 
In both the second and third reasons, Nu expressed the 
fear that Burma could become the site for a major war between 
the CPR and the members of the UN. This was not an unrealis­
tic apprehension. Since November, 1950, Chinese "volunteers" 
had been fighting UN forces in Korea. Already the UN had 
branded China an aggressor and the policies of the United 
States, Nationalist China and some of their allies in the UN 
were vigorously anti-CPR. The second reason raised the pos­
sibility that the UN might send forces into Burma against
the CPR, while the third raised the possibility that the CPR 
might send troops into Burma against the KMT and/or the 
United Nations. In either event, Burma would be a battle­
field in a two-front UN war with China. 
Since the earlier efforts of the government of Burma at 
military and diplomatic solutions had failed, Burma had no 
choice but to take the risks involved and request UN assis- · 
t ance. Nu stated that the CPR would be kept fully informed 
of all the efforts of the government to find a solution in 
the UN. The situation was getting more acute and action had 
to be taken soon, because the KMT were becoming more aggres­
sive within Burma.t8 9  
Foreign observers cited three reasons for Burma finally
seeking UN assistance. One, as U Nu indicated, was the grow­
ing danger the KMT posed to the government, especially the 
strengthening of the KMT- KNDO alliance.t9 0  A second was the 
fear that the United States and Nationalist China were plan-
87.  Ibid. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Ibid.t, p. 2 .  
90 . Virginia Thompsone, _  "Burma and the Two Chinas , "  Foreign Policy Bulle­
tin, 23  (May 1 5 ,  1953)e, p. 1 ;  Mende,  South East Asia Between 'I'Wo 
Worlds , p. 140. 
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ning a general war against China through Burma. This will 
be discussed in greater det ail below but, briefly, such ac­
tions as President Eisenhower's removal of the Seventh Fleet 
from the Formosan Strait in early February, the st alemate in 
the Korean War and the general at mosphere of "rolling back 
communism" which emanated from Washington, heightened this 
fear.o9 1  
· · 
The third reason "was to  impress further upon Communist 
China the sincerity of [ Burma's] efforts  to  end the Nat ional­
ist threat .o"9 2  This seems unlikely in light of Nu's speech 
of March 2 and the attitude of restraint demonstrated by the 
CPR. A more likely reason may have been the belief that the 
publicity which the KMT intervention would receive, if de­
bated in the UN and in the world press, would pressure the 
United States and Nationalist China to change their policies
and evacuate the KMT. 
In preparat ion for going to the UN, the government of 
Burma notoified the United States that it did not desire the 
U. S. economic aid program to con t inue past J une 30, 1953.o9 3  
Although there were other reasons for the Burmese decision to  
terminat e the U. S. aid program,9 4  the crucial factor was the 
91. Thompson, "Burma and the Two Chinas," p. 1. For example, the follow­
ing reports appeared in the Bangkok Post immediately before and 
after Nu's March 2 speech which give something of the nature of the 
prevailing atmosphere. On February 24 it was reported that National­
ist Chinese guerrillas had successfully landed on the south Chekiang 
coast of China on February 19. On February 25 it wa� reported that 
the retiring Director of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, who 
had recently toured Southeast Asia and Formosa, would recommend in 
his final report that the U.S. aid the "10 million Chinese in SQuth­
east Asia" who were "ready to support the Nationalist war effort 
against their Communist held homeland ." 
The apprehensions that the government of Burma felt must have 
been intensified by the comments of President Eisenhower that Sta­
lin' s  recent death. would be a possible cause for "exp.losions in Iran 
or Burma . "  Bangkok Post, March 5, 1953. Later that year the non­
communist government of Iran was overthrown with the assistance of 
the U .S .  CIA. Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: 
Ameriaa 's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World 
(New York: Meridian Books, 1968), pp. 226-228. 
92. Fifield, Diplomaay, p. 203. 
93. See The Department of State Bulletin, 38, no. 720 (April 13, 1953), 
p .  530, for the text of the letter of Foreign Minister Sao Hkun Hkio 
to the U.S. Ambassador, William J .  Sebald. 
94. Johnstone, Buiffla 's Foreign PoZ�4vJy, pp . 64-66. Because of the obvi­
ous anti-communist nature of the U.S. aid program, it had never been 
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Rlt r1nese h c l i e f  tl1 at  tl1e U. S. was supporting the KMT in Burma. 
I n  f a c t  , t l1e o r i g i n a l  letter rcq11es ting the termination of  
a l l  aiJ co11ta i 11eJ l anguage referring to the KM'r intervcnt i o11. 
I t  was removed by an informal agreement between the Foreign
Minister of Burma and the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon. 9 5  The 
decision to end U.S. aid was determined by the need not to 
appear linked in any compromising manner to a state which 
would have an active part in the discussion and any subse­
quent UN action. Also, terminating the aid agreement was an 
important means of demonstrating to the United States govern­
ment the displeasure of the government of  Burma with the U.S. 
role 1n the intervention. 
On March 25, the Burma government cabled the United 
Nations to ask that the gov�rnment of Formos� be charged with 
aggression. Six days later the UN Steering Commit tee agreed 
to recommend that the complaint of Burma against National ist 
China be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly.t9 6  
Before the matter could be debated in the UN, efforts 
to solve the problem outside the UN were made. After confer­
ring with the U.tS. Ambassador to Thailand, the Thai govern­
ment offered to permit the KMT passage through Thailand to 
Formosa.t9 7  The United States began a concerted effort to 
forestal l  a UN debate because it was stated that such a de­
bate would serve only  the advantage of the Soviet Union and 
would drive a wedge between the United States and the govern­
ments of Asia. The U.S. a lso offered to pay for the removal 
of the KMT'ts from Burma.t9 8  Nat ionalist China a lso attempted 
to avoid a UN debate on the quest ion.t9 9  Possibly the more 
basic reason the U . S. and Nationalist China desired to avoid 
a debate was that ful l  disclosure of a l l  the circumstances 
surrounding the KMT intervention woul d  prove embarrassing to 
them. 
popular in Burma with either politicians of th e l eft and som etimes 
the center and with the press. For a further discuss ion s ee John D. 
Montgomery, The Polities of Foreign Aid: American Experience in 
Southeast Asia (N ew York : Praeger for the Council on Foreign Rela­
tions, 196 2), pp. 32-33 and 140-146. 
95. Frank N.  Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Republic (New York : Prae-
g er, 1966), p. 321. 
96. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 32. 
97. New York Timest, March 28, 1953; Bangkok Postt, March 27, 1953. 
98. New York Times, April 8, 1953. 
99. Ibid.t, April 14, 1953. 
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The Burmese draft re solution to the UN was explicit and 
pointe d directly to the Nationalist Chine se regime as the 
re sponsible party. I t  said in part : 
The General Assembly . . .  
Notes that the armed forces of the KMT Government of For­
mosa have committed acts of infringement against the 
territorial integrity of the Union of Bunna and acts oft· 
violation of its frontiers. 
reaommeonds to the Security Council: 
a) to condemn the KMT Government of Formosa . . t. 
b) to take all necessary steps to ensure immediate cessa­
tion of acts of aggression . . .  
aalls upon all states to respect the territorial integri­
1 0 0ty of the Union of Bunna . . . t. 
In the debate in the UN Political Committee ( Committee 
I) on the charges _of Burma, the Nationalist Ch inese Ambassa-· 
dor denied that his gove rnme nt had any control over  the KMT 
in Burma but admitt�d that it did exercise some influe nce 
over  General Li  Mi and his officers.o1 0 1  Nearly all the other 
gove rnme nts supported the charge that the KMT h ad seriously 
violated the te rritorial integrity of Burma but most did not 
support the strong language of the draft resolution submitted 
· ··by Burma. 1 0 2  
On April 22, the UN Political Committee approved a Mexi­
can draft resolution with several amendments proposed by
Lebanon rather than the draft resolution of Burma. This 
substitute resolution was approved 57 to O in the Political 
Committe e ,  with Burma and Nationalist China abstaining. The 
following day the Gene ral Assembly accepted the amended Mexi­
c an resolution unanimously except for Nationalist China's 
absteontion. Burma voted for it primarily out of gratitude
to the nations which had supported Burma in the de bate . 
The re solution passe d by the Ge neral Assembly was much 
less stringent than Burma's draft had been .  It included no 
reoference to a request for Security Council action and did 
not refe r directly to the Chine se Nationalist governme nt. ·o· 
Rather it re ferred too·ounspecified "foreign forces" in Burma. 
The resolution also- said : 
100. Text taken from Trager, Bunna 's Role in the UN, pp. 10-11. 
101. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, pp. 43-47. 
102t. Ibid.  , pp. 50-72 ; see also the comments of the U.S. Ambassador to 
the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.t, The Department of State Bulletin, 
28 , No. 723 (May 4 ,  1953), p. 664. 
• • • 
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The General Assembly 
Deplores this situation and condemns the presence of 
these forces in Burma and their hostile acts against 
that country. 
Decla:r,es that these foreign forces must be disarmed and 
either agree to internment or leave the Union of Burma 
forthwith . . . 
Recommends that negotiations now in progress through the 
good offices of certain member states should be pursued 
Urges all states: 
to afford . . .  Burma . . .  all the assistance in their 
powers . . .  to refrain from furnishing any assistance 
to these forces. . . t. 103 
To the government of Burma this resolution was far from 
adequate. The weak UN response to the KMT intervention some­
what embittered the Burmese in their attitude toward the UN. 
As Burma's Ambassador to the UN, James Barrington, later said, 
"It seemed that the United Nations had two yardsticks for 
measuring aggression ; that the shorter and more handy one is 
used when Communists are involved, and a longer one is used 
if self-proclaimed anti-communists are invol,red. . . .  "t1 0 4  
The negotiations referred to in the UN resolution were 
discussions between the United States, Thailand, Nationalist 
China and Burma to establish some means of solving the prob­
lem. The proposal of Thailand •and Nationalist China to evacu­
ate some KMT's was the basis of  these negotiations. The 
United States was the prime mover behind them.t1 0 5  On May 8, 
195 3, the United States formally proposed a four-power mili­
tary conference to be attended by Nationalist China, Thai­
land, Burma and the U.S., to reach an agreement on evacua­
tion. These discussions eventually led to a partial evacua­
tion of the KMT from Burma. That story will be taken up
after discussing the roles of Nationalist China, the People's 
103. Trager, Burma's Role in the UN, p. 12. The full text of all the 
resolutions introduced is found in Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, 
p. 29. 
104. "The UN Through Burmese Eyes," pp. 8-9, speech at Colby College, 
Waterville, Maine, March 18,  1954, quoted in Trager, Bunnat's·tRole 
in the UN, p. 13. 
105. The Burmese were convinced that the United States would have to 
apply pressure on Formosa if Burma was ever to agree to a cease--fire · 
with the KM!' as they demanded. New York Times, April 20, 1953. 
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Republic of China, Thailand and the United States in the 
first KMT crisis. 
The Chinese People's Republic did not intervene in Burma 
against the KMT and this restraint is probably the chief 
reason why a major war did not occur in Burma in the early
1950t' s. PLA troops did enter Burmese territory in pursuit 
of the KMT on several occasions but "such units were always
withdrawn upon Burma'ts protest with the explanation that 
local commanders had made technical errors."t106  There was 
one report of a CPR effort to infiltrate and take over the 
KMT in Burma but it was not substantiated and no further ret­
ports of such efforts are known.t107  
Early in the KMT intervention the CPR stated that it 
would not tolerate Burma'ts harboring antit-Communist troops 
on her border. This statement raised apprehensions in Ran­
goon that the PLA might invade northern Burma. There appar­
ently was a Burma-CPR military clash in early 1950, but it 
was of little consequence.1 0 8  In March, Prime Minister Nu 
said that persons wishing to disrupt the harmonious relations 
between Burma and the CPR were spreading a myth of Burmese­
CPR hostility.t1 0 9  In  October, Nu further said that his gov­
ernment had firm assurances from Peking that the PLA would 
not pursue the KMT into Burma.t1 1 0  If the Chinese had entered 
Burma in pursuit of the KMT prior to these assurances, the 
government of Burma probably wished to deny the fact so that 
other states, such as Nationalist China or the United States, 
106. Frederick C. Teiwes, "Force and Diplomacy on the Sino-Burmese B·or­
der,t" in The Next Asia: Problems for U.S. Policy, ed. by David S. 
Smith (New York: The International Fellows Program Policy Series, 
Columbia University, 1969), p. 201. 
107. New York Times, July 16, 1952. 
108. Ibid., March 13, 1950. In June, 1950, in a radio broadcast, the 
government of China said it would not accept the construction in 
Burma of airfields for use by U. s·. or British air forces. John­
stone, Chronology, p. 19. On January 31, 1951, the Associated 
Press reported that 3,000 PLA troops had entered northern Burma to 
investigate a rumor that the United States was building ant- air base 
at Putao (formerly Fort Hertz). New York Times, February 1, 1951. 
This report was denied by the government of Burma in a letter from 
U Maung Myat Kyaw to the New York Times dated February 17, Ibid.o, 
February 26, 1951. 
109. Ibid.o, March 9, 1951. 
110. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 24. 
could not use these incursions as a pretext for a larger
anti-Chinese war. 
In December, 1 9 5 1 , the CPR issued a statement c laiming
that the U.tS. was aiding the KMT in Burma.t1 1 1  On January 3 1 , 
19 5 2 ,  U Zaw Lin, the Burmese representative, reportedly told 
the UN General Assembly that Burma was considering asking
China to aid her in dislodging the KMT. Burmese spokesmen
the next day said that Zaw Lin had been misinterpreted, and 
Burma was not considering requesting CPR aid.t1 1 2  In April, 
1 9 5 2 ,  PLA troops were reported to have clashed with the KMT 
inside Burma.113 It is not possible to determine whether 
such a c lash did occur or whether the report was fostered to 
create the appearance of enmity between Burma and China. 
During the spate of KMT activity in January and Febru­
ary, 19 5 3 ,  there was a reported offer of CPR aid to the Burma 
army. They rejected the offer. Since the report of the 
offer was made by a staff officer in northern Burma, perhaps
it was intended merely as an offer of aid in a limited area.t1 1 4 
Apparently no high level government discussions between Ran­
goon and Peking over PLA assistance occurred at this time. 
However, when U Kyin Thein spoke on the United Nations radio 
in late March, he said his government expected aid against
the KMT from both UN-member states and non-members as well .  
Many observers interpreted this to mean that he expected CPR 
assistance.1 1 5  
On balance, the government of Burma felt that the Chi­
nese government had responded with restraint and had a "cor­
rect attitude" toward the KMT provocation. The CPR was prob­
ably content to allow the Burma government to handle the 
K�1T. 116 The Chinese were certainly aware that a neutral Burma 
would be better protection to their southern border than a 
pro-Western, antit- communist Burma would be. If China had 
intended to rout the K�1T, Burma might have either joined or 
been forced into the anti-communist bloc and the CPR's prob­
lems would have been more serious. Also, China was occupied 
111. New Yo-Pk Times , December 28, 1951. 
112. Ibid.  , February 1 and 2, 1952. 
113 . Ibid.  , April 4, 1952. 
114 . Ibid.  , February 26, 1953. 
115. Ibid.  , March 28, 1953. 
116. Johnstone, Burma 's Fo-Peign Policy , p. 190. 
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at that time by the netessity of internal reconstruction fol­
lowing World War I I  and the revolution, and by the war in 
Korea. Leaving the KMT problem to the Burmese made the most 
sense to the Chinese. - To have themselves attacked the KMT 
in Burma would have been "playing the imperialist's game." 
The government of Nationalist China, as U Nu suspectedt, 
denied that it had any direct control over the KMT in Burmat� 
The government of Burma's white paper, Kuomintang Aggrtession 
Agatinst Burma, and Burma's presentation in the UNt, were in 
large measure briefs to prove that Nationalist China was in 
control of the KMT troops in Burma. The documentation pre­
sented there is fairly conclusive. This discussion will 
merely sketch in broad outline the interrelationship between 
the KMT in Burma and the Formosan government, relying on both 
Burmese and non-Burmese sources of information. 
When the KMT entered Burma in late 194 9 and early 1950, 
they were effectively cut off from the Nationalist govern­
ment. In June, 1950, General Lai Iang Tia of the KMT 26th 
Army traveled to Bangkok to consult with the Chinese Nation­
alist Military Attache there. He went to obtain instructions 
from the Nationalist government for his army.t1 1 7  General Li 
Mi, who had been appointed the President of Yunnan Province 
as well as Commander- in-Chief of the Yunnan Anti-Communist 
and National Salvation Army, reportedly went to Formosa for 
consultations in November, 1951.o1 1 8  He was back in northern 
Burma in late January, 1952o, presumably with orders from 
Taipeh .t119 In February he was in Bangkok, 120 at about the time 
that several hundred K1v1T troops returned to Burma from For­
mosa where they had received training.1 2 1  Li Mi apparently
had frequent contacts with the Nationalist government through
Bangkok and Taipeh during this period. 
In February, 1953o, immediately prior to the decision to 
go to the United Nations, General Li Mi was back in northern 
117. Interview published in La,k Maung, a Thai newspaper and reproduced 
in Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, Exhibit . Document No. 2, p. 14 2� 
118. Ibid.t, p. 13 . 
119. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 26. 
120. New York Times, F ebruary 22, 1952. 
121 . Mende, South East Asia Between Two Worlds, p. 140. 
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Rurina.t122  Alsot, at this time, the Nationalists pressured the 
French government in Indo-China to release 35,000 Chinese 
Nationalist troops interned there so that they could go to 
1 2 3Burma.t The French rejected the request .1 2 4  
On March 28, 1953, "the Nationalist Charge d'Affaires 
in Bangkok issued a statement saying that the troops in Yun­
nan were under the direct command of military headquarters
in Formosa, that they were employed in undemarcated territory 
where the authority of the Burmese government was at least 
questionable, and that their operations were really an exten­
sion of the struggle against Communism in Korea, Inda-China 
and Malaya.t"t1 2 5  In this statement the Nationalists admitted 
their direct command over the KMT but suggested the possibil-· 
ity that they were operating only in Yunnan or in parts of 
Burma claimed by Nationalist China as part of Yunnan, and 
thus of no concern to Burma or the United Nations. 
It was known that there was a direct supply line by air 
from Formosa.126  Additional evidence linking the Nationalist 
government to the supply and reinforcement of the KMT in 
Burma was noted above. 
The motives of the Chinese Nationalist government in 
keeping an army in Burma are not difficult to determine. 
There was probably an emotional attachment to these troops
by Taipeh. This was one of the last anti-communist Chinese 
armies left on the Asian mainland. More important, however, 
was the desire of Chiang Kai-shek ahd his followers to recon­
quer the mainland from the Communists. They believed their 
best hope of achieving this was through a general war on 
1 2 2 .  Determined by documents found in the possesseion of three Cauca­
sians kileled while fighting for the KMT. Burmae, Kuomintang Aggres­
sion, p. 38. 
123 .  New York Times, February 19, 1953 ,  and Nation, February 18, 1953 .  
1 24. Nation, February 19,  1953.  The French had interned these troops 
initeialely on the is lands of De Phu Aoc and I Ire off Nha Trang and 
later they had been used as laborers in the coal mines near Hanoi 
and the rubber estates in the south. 
125e. Royal Institute of International Affairs , Chronology of Interna­
tional Events, 9, p. 190. 
126. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 10; "Atlantic Report : Burma , "  p. 
6. The KMT continued to receive material and financial assistance 
from Formosa after the UN resolution cal led for an end to such 
activitiese. New York Times, July 24, 1953. 
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scve ra 1 fro11 ts wi t}1 tl1e CJJR .  The Korea11 War provi <led one 
context for st1ch a war. The activities o f  the KMT in Burma 
were designed to entice the PLA into entering Burmese terri­
tory. If Burma and the CPR would engage in conflict over 
these possible incursions, then there would be a second con­
text for a general anti-CPR offensive. As 0. E. Clubb, Jr.t, 
has written, Nationalist China "evidently - hoped to turn the 
Korean War into a general offensive against Communist China, 
in which the United States would shoulder the main military
burden of restoring the Nationalists to power.t"1 27 
Thailand's role in supporting the KMT intervention is 
less simple to understand. Relations between Thailand and 
Burma had been frozen during the period of British rule in 
Burma. Following the regaining of independence, relations 
were not friendly.t1 28 The KMT intervention was assisted by
the Thai government, primarily by allowing and perhaps aiding 
the flow of supplies and reinforcements to the KMT in north­
ern Burma through Thailand. The Karen and other rebels in 
Burma also received arms and other supplies ·through Thailand. 
In May, 1 9 5 1 ,  the government of Burma protested to Thai­
land the running of guns into Burma through Thai territory.
Reportedly rebels in Burma were exchanging rubber and wolfram 
from rebel- held areas in Burma for weapons in Thailand.t1 29 
Weapons continued to flow into Burma from Thailand although
the Thai delegate to the UN denied this during a heated de� 
bate in the UN over the KMT intervention in late January, 
1 9 5 2  . 1 3 0  
127. Oliver E.  Clubb, Jr. , The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc 
in Southeast Asia (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1962), 
p .  86. See also the New York Times special series on the CIA, . 
April 26, 1966. 
128. Within four months of independence, the government of Burma an­
nounced that Burma troops had clashed with Thai guerrillas. Ibid., 
April 9, 1948. As noted above , many influent ial Burmese believed 
Thailand had territorial des igns on Burma, especially the Tenas­
serim Coast. The eastern parts of the Shan State had been g iven 
to Thailand by the Japanese in World War I I .  
129. Ibid.,  May 25, 1951. 
130. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 26. According to the Thai government , 
the Thai police did arrest a Chinese for recruiting men to j oin the 
KMT in Burma. New York Times, February 2, 1952. In July, 1952, 
KMT General Ma Chaw-Yee , who had been wounded in what was described 
in the report as an attempted Communist takeover of a KMT training 
camp during a graduation exercise , was flown by helicopter to Thai­
land for treatment. Ibid . ,  July 16, 1953. 
34 
I n  February, 1 9 5 3, the government of Burma requested
tl1at Tl1aitland stop the flow of KMT' s into Burma from Thai­
land. The govternment of Thailand denied that there was any
sucl1 flow.t1 3 1  In April, after Burma had gone to the UN, Gen­
eral Phao, the head of the Thai police, ordered the Thai­
Burma border closed. This was intended as a gesture to show 
that neither Thailand nor the United States was aiding the 
KMT in Burma .1 3 2  General Phao was one of the Thai officials 
most intimately connected with supplying the KMT and with 
the opium trade in the area.t1 3 3  
The military efforts of the government of Burma to de­
feat the KMT added an additional strain to Thai-Burmese rela­
tions. In October, 19 5 3, two Thais were killed and five 
injured when a Burmese plane bombed a Thai village near the 
border. 1 3 4  After this incident Thai Prime Minister Pibul 
Songgram threatened to shoot down any Burmese planes which 
strayed over Thai territory.t1 35 
In the UN debate on the KMT intervention in 19 5 3, Thanat 
Khoman, the Acting Permanent Representative of Thailand to 
the UN, denied any Thai complicity in the KMT matter.1 3 6 The 
131. Bangkok Post, February 17, 1953. 
132. New York Times, April 5, 1953. 
133t. Ibid . ,  April 18, 1953; David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible 
Government (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 132-133t. General 
Phao had received considerable support to build up the police in 
Thailand from the Sea Supply Corporation which was a United States 
Central Intelligence Agency front in Bangkok. Frank C. Darling, 
Thailand and the United States (Washington, D. C. : Public Affairs 
Press, 1965), p. 114t. General Phao had close connections with pro­
KMT Chinese leaders in the Bangkok Chinese business community. 
One Chinese leader was described ast" . . t. one of the richest and 
most pro-KMT" Chinese in Bangkok who wast" . . .  virtually a member 
of one of the most powerful cliques in the Thai ruling class. In 
a sense, he is the banker and business agent of Police General 
Phao, for whom he speaks in Chinese councils.t" This important ally 
of General Phao lived in a palatial home near the residence of the 
U . S. Ambassador in Bangkokt. G. William Skinner, Leadership and 
Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (Ithaca, N .Y. :  Cornell 
University Presst, 1958), pp. 99-100. 
134. New York Times, October 16, 1953. 
135t. Ibid ., October 29, 1953. 
136. Ibid ., April 29, 1953. 
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government of Burma never formally accused Thailand of such 
a c t i v ities. ·r·11e statement of lJ Myint Thein to the UN on this 
point is  worth quoting at length : 
The question naturally arises�-where have these new 
arms come from? How is it possible for an original force 
of 1 , 500 comparatively lightly armed men to grow in the 
space of less than three years into a force of 1 2 , 000 
well armed men? Obviously this could not happen in the 
hinterland of Burma unless some outside power were fur­
nishing the inspiration, leadership, direction and equip­
ment. Even if we had no other evidence, by the process 
of elimination we would inevitably arrive at the conclu­
sion that the outside power was Formosa. How all this 
material was transported �nto Burma is something we do 
not wish to delve into too deeply here since the material 
is already in. Obviously all of it could not have been 
brought in by aircraft although we know that planes have 
been used for some time. 
I submit, Mr. Chairman, I have made a case that 
first, hostile and alien units are operating in my coun­
try. We are. not concerned, nor is it relevant to us as 
to what their ostensible  aim is. We have no desire to 
make statements which could lead to the construction 
that governments of other countries are involved. Such 
statements should be avoided since they may add to the 
tension that .exists today in the international sphere. 
But we do say that these troops who call themselves the 
26th Army or the Anti-Communist Salvation Army or the 
Peace Guerrillas and . who are definitely Chinese with 
some occidental instructors or advisers, are within the 
territorial limits of our country and are creating havoc 
and fighting the Burmese forces. 1 3 7 
In hopes of not antagoni z ing Thailand and in getting Tha it. 
cooperattion in the removal of the KMT, the Burmese apparently
felt it was best not to discuss the Thai role. 
It is difficult to determine precisely the motives of 
the Thais in assisting the KMT. Personal profit and funds 
for political party activ ities made through the opium and 
gun trade may have motivated individual officers, including 
General P�ao. Thai Premier Pibul Songgram contended that the 
KMT in Burma were a buffer between Thailand and an aggres­
s ive, expansionist Communist China.t1 3 8  Whether Pibul ·actually 
believed this or merely used anti-communismt'tas a rationalitza-
137. Burma, Kuomintang. Aggression, p. 41. 
138. New York Times, June 3 ,  1953. 
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tion for other goals cannot be determined. Perhaps more im­
portant was the desire for territorial aggrandizement at the 
expense of Burma. As Alastair Lamb has written, " . . .  any
serious decline in the power of the Burmese central govern­
ment--especially if it were to occur in a period of active 
anti-Chinese American influence in mainland Southeast Asia- ­
might well tempt the authorities in Bangkok to give thought 
to territorial expansion in that westward direction which 
had once been blocked by European imperial frontier policy.t"t1 3 9 
In his UN speech, U Myint Thein asked how did 1,500  
lightly armed Nationalist Chinese troops in less thart three 
years grow into 12,t0 0 0  well armed troops. The government of 
the United States, or at least an agency of it, was responsi­
ble for supplying much of the weapons, ammunition, other sup­
plies and perhaps leadership of the KMT in Burma. The United 
Statest' role is discussed here in two sections. First is a 
brief sketch of how the United States supplied the KMT, and, 
secondt, an analysis of why the United States got involved in 
such an affair. 
Many Burmese feared that the United States, through its 
economic aid program, was attempting to use Burma as a pawn
in the Cold War. The government of Burma denied that there 
was any truth to such apprehensions.t1 4 0  However, rumors and 
reports of suspicious activities by American citizens contin­
ued to make the Burmese, especially left-wing politicians,
suspicious of the motives of the United States. 1 4 1  
I n  December, 1951, China claimed that the head of the 
U.tS. Military Advisory Group in Thailand had contacted the 
Nationalist Chinese Military Attache in Bangkok and had then 
flown to Formosa for further consultations on aid to the 
K1'1T . 1 42 The London Obtser ver reported that there was "indi s -
putable evidence that Americans were helping the 93rd [ KMT] 
139.  Alastair Lamb , Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing FTobtZem 
(London : Pall Mal l ,  1968) , p .  158. 
140e. Cady, History of Modern Burma, p. 620 ;  Montgomery, The Politics of 
Foreign Aid, pp. 31-33e. 
141 .  Fairbairn, "Burma and the ' Cold War.e' "  In early 1951 there were 
rumors that the United States was building an air base in northern 
Burma at Putao (formerly Fort Hertz)e. New York Times, February 1 ,  
195 1e. In November of the same year a wrecked U.eS . -made helicopter 
was found in northern Burma. Mende, South East Asia Between Two 
Worlds, p .  140 .  
142 .  New York Times, December 28, 1951 .  
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l) i v ·i s ion. Two Americans accompanied it in its ignominious 
offensive l ast autumn [ into Yttnnan ] ,  an<l when retreat fol-. 
lowed a 1'11ai  police helicopter was sent to evacuate them. 
• " 1 4 3• • KM'f troops who surrendered to the Burma army said 
that they had been assisted into Burma by an American organi­
zation in Bangkok .1 4 4  
In the debate at the UN General Assembly meeting in Paris 
in late January, 1952, the Soviet Union and other social-
ist governments accused the United States of supporting the 
KMT in Burma. The Burma delegate acknowledged that the KMT 
had outside sources of supply but refused to specify what 
governments were responsible. 1 4 5  Western sources in February
stated that the KMT's did possess new, post-World War II 
United States weaponst. The KMT's claimed they would "ki ck 
the communists out of Yunnan with United States and British 
help. "t1 4 6  There were also reports that U. S. engineers were 
assisting the KMT in the construction of an airfield at 
Monghsat in February, 1952. 1 4 7  In April, 1952, the U. S. Am ­
bassador to Burma, David McK. Key, resigned and was succeed­
ed by William J. Sebald. It was later revealed that Key
resigned because the U. S. Department of State did not iriform 
him of U. S. assistance to the KMT.1 4 8  
Rumors and reports of U. S. aid to the KMT continued 
through 1952 and 1953. "An unimpeachable Ameritcan source in 
Southern Shan State" reported "that the Chinese troops [were] 
handing the Shan villagers slips of paper in return for com­
mandeered supplies on which [was] written : 'The Amer i cans 
will pay.t' " 1 49 In March, 1953, Defense Minister Ba Swe said 
that his government had evidence that some American citizens 
had been training and arming the KMT. He said he had no 
proof that they were U. S. government agents.t1 5 0  On March 27, 
143. Quoted in Maung, Grim War, p. 144e. 
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1953t, three Caucasians who had been fighting with the KMT 
were killed by the Burma army.t1 5 1  Two of them wore United 
State army uniforms. In their possession were diaries and 
notebooks in which were New York City and Washington, D. C., 
addresses. They were apparently small arms instructors for 
the KMT.t1 52 The War Office of the government oft·tBurma said 
the three were Americans. The U. S. Embassy denied this and 
suggested that the three were Germans.t153  Later, the Thai 
police announced that the three were indeed Germans. Two 
were said to have been deserters from the French Foreign
Legion and one a bandit.1 5 4  Whatever their nationality, the 
papers in their possession did indicate to the Burmese that 
155the U. S. government was responsible for their behavior.t
Again in April there was a report of several white men killed 
by the Burmese, but their bodies were reportedly removed by 
the KMT.t156 The KMT in the spring of 1953 had weapons that 
the United States had introduced in Korea just eighteen
months earlier, including 7 7mm recoilless cannon which were 
157highly mobile in jungle situations.t . 
It is not certain whether the Burmese government avoided 
accusing the U. S. government for diplomatic reasons or if 
the Burma officials were not informed about the operations
of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  in Asia. De­
fense Minister Ba Swe did say in an interview that the "China 
Lobby" was supporting the KMT. 1 5 8  The China Lobby has been a 
151e. New York Times, March 27, 1953; New York Herald Tribune, March 27, 
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powerful force i n  shaping U. S. foreign policy i n  Asia. It 
had had close ties wi th the CIA through the agency'os many 
acti vi ti es on Taiwan.o1 59 Later, i n  1953 , the· "Burmese secret 
servic e" accused two U . S.o-owned companies of selling arms to 
the KMT. These corporati ons were the Southeast Asi a Corpora­
ti on and the Bangkok Commercial Corporation. Neither was 
li sted i n  Dun and Bradstreet or other r eference director i es 
of Ameri can busiones_ses. 1 60 Perhaps they were CIA fronts-, as 
was Sea Supply Company i n  Bangkok. 1 6 1  U Myint Thein told the 
U N  Poli tical Committee i n  November , 1953 , th�t Western E ntero­
pr ises Incorporated supporoted the KMT.o1 6 2  Thi s corporation 
was a CIA front i n  Formosa. 1 6 3  
In Apri l, 1952, Sirdar J. J .  Si ngh, President of the 
India League of America,  reported that former U. S. Air Force 
pi lots were flyi ng suppli es to the KMT i n  Burma.o1 64 He was 
undoubtedly referri ng to pilots for Civi l Air Transport
(CAT) , the airli ne founded by General Claire Chennault i n o. 
1946o. CAT o�erated out of Formosa and i ts planes were seen. 5over Burma.o1 CAT was closely connectedo- with American i ntel­
li gence operations i n  Asi a throughout the 1950's and has 
of this committee was Gen. William J. Donovan, first head of the 
CIA ' s  predecessor organization, the O.tS.S.t, and later U.S. Arnbassa­
dor to Thailand. Koen, China Lobby in Ameriaan Politiaso, pp. 
59-60. 
159. Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: Morrow and Com­
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As noted above, General Phao and the KMT were involved in the 
opium trade in Burma and Thailand. There is, in the words of Koen, 
"considerable evidence that a number of Chinese officials have en­
gaged in the illegal smuggling of narcotics into the United States 
with the full knowledge and connivance of the Chinese Nationalist 
Government. . . t• The narcotics business has been an important f�c­
tor in the activities and permutation of the China Lobby.t" Koen, 
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since been absorbed by Air America, the unofficial airline 
of the CIA in Laos.166 
In March, 1953t, Homer Bigart, writing in the New York 
Her a ld Tribune , obliquely made reference to official U.S. 
involvement in supporting the KMT. He wrotet: 
Officially, the United States never supplied or advised 
the Li Mi contingent. But up to a year ago Bangkok was 
full of cloak and dagger operatives and some American 
citizens unquestionably shuttled back and forth on mys­
terious missions between Bangkok and Li Mi'ts airstrip 
north of Kengtung. The State Department always kept its 
skirts clear of these colorful folk.t167 
Virginia Thompson reported the CIA's involvement in the 
Foreign  Po licy B u l l e tin  of the Council on Foreign Relations 
of May 15, 1953. Two of the persons apparently least in­
formed about the KMT involvement of the U.S. were the two 
U.St. Ambassadors to Burma in the early fiftiest, William J. 
Sebald and David McK. Key. Ambassador Sebald was told of 
these activities by General Ne Win. Both men resigned in 
protest of being kept uninformed of their government'ts activ­
ities--activities of which they presumably disapproved.t168 
Any analysis of the motivations of the U.S. government
in supporting the KMT in Burma must take into account U. S. 
policy toward China in the early 1950'ts and especially the 
Korean War. The Communist revolution in China had been a 
traumatic event for the United States. The stalemate in the 
Korean Wart' '  . . .  added force to the feeling that the only
solution to the problem of Communist China was that country''s
total defeat." 1 69 
Throughout the final years of the rruman administration 
there was tension between those who wanted a general war 
with China and those who favored a foreign policy which 
sought to limit the presumed spread of communism in Asiat, 
while concentrating on more important goals in Europe. Those 
favoring total war with China included General Douglas
MacArthur, General Claire Chennault and members of the China 
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Loh b y . P ·re s .i d <:� n t 1' r u111a11 an J th c St :.1 t c Depart rr1 en t apparc n t 1 y 
pre ferre<.l a pol icy desigr1eJ to "lim i t  co1nmunist expansion." 
On December 30, 1949, President Truman approved a· 
National Security Council study which set the goals of U.S. 
foreign policy in Asia. In the words of the Pentagon Papers
study, these goals were tot" . . .  block further Communist 
expansion in Asia."t1 7 0  To carry out the goal of blocking
"further Communist expansion" the Joint Chiefs of Staff rec­
ommended to the Secretary of Defense in April, 1950, that 
steps be taken "to reduce the pressure from Communist China. 
In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the 
evidence of renewed vitality and apparent increased effec­
tiveness of the Chinese Nationalist forces.t"t1 7 1  
A strategy of blocking "further communist expansion in 
Asia" is sufficiently vague to be given different interpretat­
tions in different places and at different times. It is re­
ported that President Truman offered to fly Indian troops
into Tibet in 1950, as part of this strategy.t1 7 2  While Truman 
interpreted U.S. strategic interests as being essentially de­
fensive, others saw them as offensive.t1 7 3  
170. Neil Sheihan, The Pentagon Papers (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 
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other governments in and out of the area which are more directly 
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lands against a feared Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia" whereas 
at another he says that the CIA supported the KMT so that they 
would invade Yunnan "on the theory that the Chinese masses would 
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General MacArthur wanted to use troops from National·ist 
China in the Korean War.1 7 4  This policy was rejected by Tru­
man apparently because of apprehension that it would widen 
the conflict with China. On March 24, 1951, eighteen days
before he was relieved of his command by President Truman, 
General MacArthur issued a statement from Tokyo calling for 
a "decision by the United Nations to depart from its tole:rant 
effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an 
expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas 
and interior bases [to ] doom Red China to the risk of immi­
nent military collapse . " t1 7 5  G�neral Claire Chennault, the 
head of Civil Air Transport and a very close advisor to 
Chiang Kai-shek, testified in 1958 that a plan did exist to 
implement MacArthur'ts idea of a broader war against China, 
to end the stalemate in Korea and to remove the Communist 
government from the mainland. He saidt: 
. . .  It is reported--and I have reason to believe it is 
true--that the Nationalist Government offered three ful l  
divisions . . .  of troops to fight in Korea,  but the 
great opportunity was not putting the Nationaleists in 
Korea. It was a double  envelopment operation. With the 
United Nations forces in Korea and the National ist Chi­
nese in southern areas . . .  the Communists would have 
been caught in a giant pincers . . e. .  This was a gr�at 
opportunity--not to put the National ist Chinese in Korea, 
but to let them fight in the south .e1 7 6  
President Truman did not order a wider war with China. 
He argued that MacArthur and other advocates of such a policy 
were not keeping in mind what he perceived as the greater
threat to Europe posed by the Soviet Union.t1 77 If. the United 
rally  to their banners" and overthrow the communist governmente. 
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. 
States had j oined National ist China in a maj or war with the 
CPR, the U . S . would have had to do the greater share of the 
fighting . Truman later wrot·e, "A l l - out m i l i tary act ion 
against China had to be avoided, if for no other reason than 
because it was a gigantic booby trap . "  1 7 8  . 
If Truman would not countenance a general war with 
China, why did the U . S. Central Intelligince Agency support 
the KMT in Burma for the purpose of creat ing a war on China ' s  
southern border ? Perhaps the CIA with the support of influ­
ential U . S. citizens in and out of government, such as mem­
bers of the China Lobby, and with the col lusi on of the gov­
ernment of National ist China , acted wi thout the approval and 
knowledge of President Truman . A lthough some bel i eve the CIA 
support of the KMT was · inst igated "at the top of the State 
" 1 7 9Department, there is no hard evidence to support nor to 
gainsay such a content ion .  There is good reason to believe , 
however, that the CIA supported the KMT in Burma for the pur­
pose of harassing " Peking to a point where i t  might retal iate 
against Burma , forcing the Burmese to turn to the United 
States fo! protect ion . "  1 ao 
A comparison of the chronology of KMT mil itary actions 
aga inst Yunnan with the chronology of the Korean War reveals 
several parallels. The first maj or KMT assault  on Yunnan was 
made in the first week of May, 1951, j ust after the April  23 
offensive of the Communist forces in Korea . 1 8 1 The second 
maj or KMT offensive took place in July, 1951, whi le truce 
talks were beginning at Kaesong, Korea. The third . KMT attack 
came in August, 1951, while cease-fire talks at Kaesong were 
in a del icate stage. 1 8 2 In November, UN forces were ordered 
to cease al l offensive operations. A stalemate ensued in 
Korea unt i l  the end of the war, 1 8 3  dur ing which KMT activi ties 
increased in Burma . New U . S . equipment and fresh Chinese 
National ist troops entered Burma via Thailand from Formosa · 
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in early 1952. 1 8 4  CIA agents are reported to have entered 
Burma to visit the KMT commanders during 1952.1 8 5  However, 
the KMT did not attempt another major assault on Yunnan un­
til the last week of January, 1953.t1 8 6  While this comparison 
demonstrates little that is conclusive, it does suggest that 
U.S. interest in the KMT increased with the stalemate in the 
Korean War. 
In 1952,t· President-elect Eisenhower apparently concluded 
that the KMT were of no military value and he tried to con­
vince Chiang Kai-shek to remove them.1 8 7  At the time, the 
New York Times reported that "although the United States once 
displayed some interest in the potential of the Nationalist 
guerrillast, their failure to develop this potential in regard 
to China and their excesses in Burma have persuaded official 
observers that they are more of a headache than an asset."t1 8 8  
It is not likely that the government of Burma was aware 
of the changing U.S. attitude toward the KMT. The Presi­
dentt' s  act of February 2, 1953, "to rescind the order pre­
venting attacks from Formosa against the Chinese mainland, 
as a token of America'ts determination ' to broaden the war 
against China if the Korean stalemate continued, 1 11 1 8 9  ap­
peared to the Burmese as a sign that the KMT were going to 
try earnestly to create a war on the Sino-Burmese border. 
The increase in KMT activity in Burma early in 1953 may have 
been more to impress the United States of their military
utility than to create a war with China.t1 9 0  The government 
of Burma most likely would not have known this either. 
The Burmese may also have believed that the KMT might
be used by the C IA to threaten their government if its· neu­
tralist foreign policy became too conciliatory toward the 
People'ts Republic of China. 1 9 1  Western observers were pre-
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di ct ing in Apr i1 ,  1 9  5 1 , tl1a t Rangoon would become an "impor­
' 't1 9 2tant international Commu11ist liaison center. At ·tabout 
this time the Soviet Union and the CPR. were opening embassies 
in Rangoon. The Viet Minh also opened an office ih Rangoon 
at this time but it was later closed at the request of the 
government of Burma.t1 9 3 ·Given the socialist domestic policy
of the Burmese and the inability of �ost U. S. officials to 
distinguish between socialism and "aggressive communism,t" it 
is conceivable that some U.S. officials may have wanted to 
pressure the government of Burma to conduct a pro-U.S. for­
eign and domestic policy. Also, U. S. policy makers may have 
felt that the KMT might prove useful as an anti-communist 
military force if the Communist insurgents should have ap­
peared to have been winning the civil war.1 9 � 
Officials in various parts of the United States govern­
ment apparently perceived the utility of the KMT from differ­
ent perspectives. The President, and perhaps the State 
Department, appear to have seen the KMT as a useful force to 
"block Chinese communist aggression" into Southeast Asia. 
The C IA seems to have wanted to use the KMT primarily as a 
force to harass the Chinese government into invading Burma 
so as to force Burma into the Western camp within the UN. 
After that had been done, then it presumably would have be en 
much easier for U. S. forces under UN auspices to go to war 
with China thrtiugh Southeast Asia. Whatever the exact goals
and motives of the U. S. government, it is clear that the C IA 
actively supported the i<MT in Burma from 1951 to 1 95 3  and.
that at least some officials of the U.S. government hoped to 
open a second front against China through Burma during thet· 
Korean War stalemate. 
Whether motivated by Burma'ts request for United Nations' 
assistance or by the decision that the KMT was not a practi­
cal anti-CPR military force or both, the United States in 
March, 1 95 3 ,  set into motion steps to evacuate some ·tof the 
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12 , 000 KMT troops in Burma. In early May the United States. 
called for talks among Burma, Nationalist China, Thailand 
and the U.S.1 9 5  Burma refused at that time to join such talks 
but did send a delegation to Bangkok to meet with Thai and 
U.S. officials when the talks began on May 2 2 ,  1953. Burma 
was unwilling to meet with the Nationalist Chinese.t1 9 6  How­
ever, when it appeared that a settlement was within reach, 
the Burmese delegates did meet with all three delegations on 
June 16, 1953.19t7 Soon after the enlarged talks began, the 
Burmese became disgruntled by the Nationalist Chinese reiter­
ation of the claim that they had no control over the KMT in 
Burma. Also, the Nationalist Chinese were unwilling to offer 
protection for Burma's observers at Monghsat, the KMT head­
quarters, during the evacuation period.198  Reportedly, the 
United States attempted to mediate these disputes. 199 On 
June 2 2 ,  the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Edwin F. Stanton, 
announced that an evacuation procedure had been agreed upon
by all four parties. Stanton said the evacuation was to last 
three to four weeks.200 
The leaders of the KMT troops in Burma refused to ac­
knowledge the evacuation plan and said they would not with­
draw.201 Under apparent U. S. pressure, the Formosan govern­
ment sent several officers to Bangkok and northern Burma to 
persuade the KMT to be evacuated.t20 2 The KMT leadership
claimed that their troops had no desire to withdraw203 and 
that they were the only force stopping an invasion of 150,000 
PLA troops into Southeast Asia. Burmese and Thai officials 
disputed the J0.1T claimt. 20 4 The KMT later requested that they
be established in a "neutral zone" between China and Burma 
195. New York Times, May 9, 1953 . 
196. Ibid., May 14, May 22, May 24, 1953. 
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as a mobi l e  anti-communi st force for use in case of Communi s t  
aggression in Soutoheast Asia. They wanted U�oS. support ino· 
such a ventoure.o20 5 The troops cl aimed that most wer e indige­
nous t o  northern Burma and southern Yunnan and should not be 
sent to  Taiwan. Despite the disparity of t he sit uat ions, 
they demanded voluntary repatriat ion as had been pract iced 
in the Korean War . 20 6 
In the face of this KMT intransigence, the Burmese be­
came most annoyed� On July 30, Defense Minister Ba Swe said 
that Burma was going t o  the UN to  have Nat ionalist China de­
clared an aggressor a nd unseated from. the UN.o20 7 Finally, on 
August 8, General Li Twe-fen, deputy :commander of the KMT in .
Burma, after retur ning t o  Bangkok from Taipei, announced· 
that 1, 700 troops would be withdrawn. He claimed the rest 
of the KMT were local residents and would not be willing t o  
go t o  Taiwan.o20 8 Approximately one month later, Dr . Shao 
Yu-an, the Nationalist Chinese Ambassador to  South Korea, 
was sent to  Burma by Chiang Kai-shek for the avowed purpose
of persuading the KMT to withdraw.209 
As the Bangkok evacuation talks dragged on int o mid­
September, with no soloution in view, Burma again threat ened 
to go to  the UN unless Nationalist China implemented the 
withdrawal agreement of June 22.o21 0 On September 17, the 
Burma delegation withdrew from the four- power talks in Bang­
kok because the Nationalist Chinese woul d not agree to t heir 
dema nd t hat 5 , 000 KMT' s be withdrawn in three months and 
that the remaining 7, 000 be out of B urma at the end of six 
months.o21 1 
In lat e  September, the air force of Burma began bombing
Monghsat t o  prepare the way for an  army assault on the KMT. 
205. Ibid.o, July 24 and August 1, 1953. 
206. Ibid.o, July 24, 1953. 
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The announcement of these military efforts came after a Thai 
announcement that the first 200  KMT's were to be withdrawn 
October S. The government of Burma denied any knowledge of 
the Thai announcement.t212 On October 6, the bombing of Mong­
hsat was halted to permit the KMT to withdraw.t2 1 3  
As these events developed, the government of Burma was 
asking that the KMT question be placed at the top of the 
agenda of the UN Political Committee.t2 1 4  The United States 
argued that the UN should defer any action on the matter.2 15 
Over this U.tS. objection, the KMT intervention was placed on 
the UN agenda.2 1 6  The UN debated the affair again in late 
October but took no new action.2 17 Burma's delegate, U Myint
Thein, while noting that the Chinese Nationalist government 
was directly responsible for the KMT's in his country, argued
that if the United States was willing to deny support to 
Chiang Kai-shek because of the KMT's refusal to withdraw, 
they would depart promptly. The UN tabled the issue on 
November 5 pending the results of the evacuation .2 18 
The negotiations in Bangkok continued during October. 
U Ba Swe, on October S, stated that only Nationalist China 
had not agreed to the evacuation plan.2 19 Finally, on Octo­
ber 29, a joint U. S. -Thai-Nationalist Chinese communique was 
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213. Ibid.o, October 7, 1953. 
214. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 37. 
215. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., said in the UN, "Our information leads us 
to believe that developments of the next several weeks may con­
siderably alter the situation, and the United States therefore 
feels that consideration of the matter should be deferred in the 
hope and expectation that these developments will materialize and 
reduce the tension in that area." The Department of State Bu lletin, 
29, No. 746 (October 12, 1953), p. 497. 
216. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 37. 
217. The Burmese delegation released 
by General Li Mi and others, to 
in Burma, to build an airfield, 
an anti-communist base on Chinat
31, 1953. 
at the UN letters reputedly written 
their troops, telling them to stay 
recruit more troops and continue as 
' s  border. New York Times, October 
218. Johnstone, Chronology, p .  38. 
219. Ibid . ,  p. 37. 
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i s  s t1e <.l i n  Bangkok stating ·tha t 2 , 000 - KMT's ,  including their 
fa111 i lies,  we re to h e  withdrawn starti ng November 7,  t hat 
Nat i onalist Cl1 i na would no longer s upply the KMT, and t hat 
2 2 0those which reomained in Burma would be disavowed. 
The withdrawal occurred in three phase s .  The firs t· be ­
gan November 7 and continue d into De cember, 195 3 .  The seocond 
and third phasoes were conducte d during the periods Fe bruary 
1 4-28 and May 1 - 7, 1 954, respe ctive ly.o2 2 1  The firs t phase of 
the evacuation was halted the day after it had beg un because 
the Th�i police refused to permit Burme se observers at the 
Thai border to s upervise the e vacuation.o222 The evacuation 
proces s  was res umed November 1 3  after the Thai police per­
mitted a Burmese observer team to e nter Thailand.o223  
There is no agreeme nt between Burmese  figures and thos e 
of the U.oS. and Nationalis t China on the total numbe r of the 
KMT's evacuate d. At the e nd of the firs t period of evacua­
tion in November-December, 1 953, the Joint Military Committee 
reported that 1, 81 0  troops and 439  dependents had bee n  evacu­
ate d to Taiwan.o2 24 Other s ources suggest that les s  than 2 , 000 
were withdrawn. There is general �greeme nt that not all the 
220. New York Times, October 31, 1953. 
221. United Nations Document A/2739, pp. 5-6. During the evacuation KMT 
troops were given safe conduct through Kengtung State to Tachilek 
on the Thai border. There they were to turn in their weapons. and 
go by truck to Chiengmai, Thailand, to be flow to Formosa. The 
cost of the flights to Formosa was to be shared by Burma, National­
ist China and the United States. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 38. 
It is safe to assume that the United States paid most of the 
bill. The U.tS. Embassy in Bangkok contracted with Civil Air Trans­
port to fly the KMT's out at a cost of one hundred and twenty-three 
dollars per person. "Out of Burma to Join Chiang,t" Life, 35 (De­
cember 7,  1953), p. 35. 
222. New York Times, November 9, 1953. Also, there was a dispute over 
the nationality of 58 Shans who were among the first contingent of 
204 KMT's leaving Burma. The Burmese claimed they were KMf re­
cruits from Burma while the Nationalist Chinese claimed they were 
Yunnanese. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 38. The New York Times for 
November 10, 1953, reported there were 3 9 ,  not 58, Shans in the 
group. The Shans told U. S. officials at the border they had been 
recruited by the KMT within the week preceding their evacuation. 
223. Ibid., November 11, 1953; Johnstone, Chronology, p. 38. 
224. United Nations Document A/2740, p. 5. 
5 0  
people evacuated were Chinese troops.225 
Out of the total of 12,o000 KMTt' s  in Burma, the Burmese 
govertnment reported to the UN tl1at 5,o3 2 9  men and 1,o142 depent­
dents had been withdrawn by September 1, 1954.o226 The Joint 
Military Committee reported a somewhat higher number of witht­
drawals, plus the removal of almost 1,o300 weapons and 50,o000 
rounds of ammunition sent to Taiwan. In late May, 1954, 
General Li Mi announced the dissolution of the Yunnan Anti­
Communist and National Salvation Army from his office in 
Taipei. 227 
The government of Burma again asked for a UN debate on 
the KMT intervention in the fall of 1954, but the UN took no 
action.t228 After more than four years of military and diplo­
matic efforts, Burma still was left with more than 6 , o000 
Nationalist Chinese troops within its borders. 
225. Many were Shans, young boys and women. Also, relatively few weapons 
were turned in and those which were, were "museum pieces" of little 
value. Tinker, Uniont, pp . 53-54. The Department of State Bulle-
tin, 30, No. 758 (January, 1954), pp. 32-34. Because the first KMT 
evacuees turned in no weapons in violation of the evacuation agree­
ment, "U.tS. Ambassador to Thailand Gen. William Donovan cabled the 
U.S. Embassy in Taiwan, demanding that the KMT be ordered to bring 
out their weapons. On November 9 ,  the U.S. Ambassador to Taiwan, 
Karl L. Rankin, replied that if the United States did not ease its 
pressure, China threatened to expose CIA support of the KMT in 
Burma. Donovan cabled back that the ' Chicomst' and Soviets already 
knew about the CIA operations and kept up his pressure. When the 
.KMf withdrawal was later resumed, the soldiers carried rusting 
museum pieces as their arms.t" McCoy, Politics of Heroin, P.t· 133, 
citing an interview with William vanden Heuval who had been execu­
tive assistant to Ambassador Donovan. 
The final report of the Joint Military Conunittee stated that 
the evacuated KMI' s had turned in a total of 1,312 weapons, includ­
ing 29 pistols, 588 carbines, 484 rifles, 69 machine guns, and 22 
mortars. UN Document A/3740, p .  9. 
226. United Nations Document A/2739, p .  6. 
227. New York Times, May 3, 1954. 
228. Johnstone, Burmat's  Forteign Policy, p. 232. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONTItNUED EFFECTS OF THE KMT 
INTERVENTI ON, 1954-1961 
The partial evacuation of the KMT relieved some of the 
pressure on the government and army of Burma. While the re­
maining 6,000 KMT's never posed the problem for internal 
security the initial 12,000 had, they were still a concern 
for the government. 
The most troublesome activity of the KMT was their con­
tinued assistance to the insurgent movements of the minori­
ties, especially the Shans and the Karens. While many de­
tails of these activities are not available in Western 
sources, it is known that the KMT did continue their collu­
sion with the KNDO throughout the 1950'ts and they began
assisting the Shan National Army in its secessionist efforts. 
The Burma army continued to apply military pressure bn 
the KMT throughout the 1950's.t1 At the same time the army 
1. In July, 1954, the army clashed with 500 KMf'ts forty miles north of 
Kengtung. New York Times, July 2, 1954. 
In April, May and June, 1955, the Burma army conducted "Operation 
Yangyiaung" against the KMT. Tinker, Union, p. 55. This coincided 
with the army offensive against the KNDO begun in Marcl1 and followed 
an ambush on a party of Burma troops near Tachilek in January which 
had included General Ne Win. New York Times, January 23, 1955. The 
New Times of Burma reported in February, 1955, that twenty-seven 
plane loads of KMf'ts from Formosa had landed at Muong Sing airfield 
in Laos and were filtering into Burma, but the report was never sub·­
stantiated. New York Times, February 21, 1955. Operation Yangyiaung 
appeared to be at least a partial military success. In March, before 
Operation Yangyiaung officially began, the Burma army captured a KMf 
headquarters at Mong Yaun, thirty miles south of Monghsat. Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chronology of International 
Events, 11, p. 175. In April, Burma army troops captured six moun­
tain p.ositions from the KMT in thet· south of the Shan State. New 
York Times, April 9, 1955. Later in April the KMT launched an attack 
on Tachilek but were unable to take the town. New York Times, April 
21, 1955. Clashes continued around Tachilek into May. Royal Insti­
tute of International Affairs, Chronology of International Events, 11 ,  
pp. 312-313. 
Military operations continued against the KMT after 1955, during 
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6. 
pursued the KNDO who continued to slip across the Thai border 
for trade and protection.o2 As late as April, 196 1, the Ran­
goon Natoion reported that the South Burma Command of the army 
had released a series of captured documents which were al­
leged to demonstrate that the KMT in Burma was still receiv­
ing orders from General Li Mi in Formosa and that the KNDO 
had been in contact not only with local K:tv1T commanders but 
also with Formosa through the Kawthulei embassy in Bangkok.o3 
The documents were also reported to show that the KNDO lead­
ership had been in contact with high officers of the Thai 
army. The documents indicated , the Nation  said , that arms,
ammunition and money were being supplied to the KNDO from 
Nationalist China, through the Kawthulei office in Bangkok.o4 
While these reports are not conclusive evidence of a KMT- KNDO 
alliance, they suggested to the Burmese that aid continued 
long after Nationalist China and Thailand had promised to endo. 
their assistance to anti-government forces. 
Most of the Shans remained loyal to the central govern­
ment throughout the KMT emergency but restiveness increased 
as the time neared for the feudal sawbwas ( hereditary rulers) 
to be compensated for relinquishing their traditional powers 
5to the central government.o Shan dissatisfaction with the 
government of Burma increased in the late 1950's. I n  1960o, 
the S han National Army was established to fight for the 
secession of the Shan State from Burma.o6 The Shan troops, 
most of whom were located around Kengtung , the area of the 
largest KMT concentration, were motiovated primarily by a dis­
like of the Burma army. The Shans reportedly got some of 
every dry season but they were of smaller scale. Most of the impor­
tant fighting occurred on or near the Chinese border and wil l  be 
noted below in conjunction with the discussion of the Sino-Burmese 
border treaty and the second evacuation. 
2 .  Tinker, Union, p. 57.  Combined KMT-KNDO units were reported in 1956 
to be sacking towns within 50 miles of Moulmein. New York Times ,  
February 4 ,  1956. In 1959 KMT ' s  were sti l l  assisting rebel bands 
within 80 miles of Kentung City. There they had taken up ambushing 
trucks. Ibid . ,  June 8, 1959. 
3 .  Kawthulei is the Karen name for their homelande. 
4.  Nation, April 24 and 25 ,  1961e. 
Geoffrey Fairbairn,  "Some Minority Problems in Burma , "  Paaifia 
Affairs, 30 (December, 1957)e, p. 3 1 1 .  
George Patterson, "The Shans in Arms ,"  The Far Eastern Eaonomia 
Review, 49 (July 2 2 ,  1965) , p .  178. 
--------
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their weapons from the KMT .o7 In addition t o  providing much 
of tl1e 1not ivat i on and weaponry for the Shan rebell i on, the 
KMT also provi d ed ins tructors for the Shan National Army .o8 
The KMT's motivation in s upporting the Shan rebels may
have been primarily economic. The KMT i n  Burma had adopt ed 
opium production and smuggling as early as 1952.o: With the 
ending of opium smuggling out of Yunnan by the mid- 1950 ' s , o9 
the value of poppy production in the Shan States i ncreas ed.o1 0  
When t he Burma army t odk  the town of Wanton from the KMT i n  
1959, they found three plants for the proces sing of opi um , 
morphine and cocaine.o1 1  Rewards for the murder of B urma 
Immigrat ion officoers made in 1961, were probably offered by
the KMT becaus e thes e officials could have hamp.er ed the s mug­
gling of drugs out of Burma.o1 2  
The most important domes tic political event i n  Burma 
during the late 1950' so- was the establishment of a caretaker 
military government which t ook power on October 29, 195 8 ,  
and governed until 1960. A s plit within t he ruling Anti­
Fas cis t  People's Freedom League caused by "pers onal antago­
nis m, s t ructural defects and the changing political climate" 
was the primary cause of the approval of military government
by the Burma legis lat ure.o1 3  The roots of thes e c�us es lay
in the inability of t he Nu government to  s olve a variety of 
problems to  the res t  of t he elite's s atis faction. Among
these was the problem of increasing armed anti-government 
activities throughout the country.o1 4  While t he KMT interven-
7. The KMT were apparently receiving these arms by air as "foreign 
travelers" in the Kengtung area reported "frequent landings and de­
partures of aircraft from the Chinese controlled region." New York 
Times, February 12, 1960. 
8.  Nation, March 3, 1961. 
9 .  McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, p. - 88,  citing U.tS. Bureau of Narco­
tics and Dangerous Drugs, "The World Opium Situation" (Washington, 
D.tC.t: U . S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 27. 
10. KMT attacks on villages in the Shan State such as the one reported 
in the Nation of January 3 ,  1960, were probably designed to extract 
opium from the indigenous villagers. 
11. New York Timeso, May 20, 1959. 
12. Nation, January 16, 1961. 
13. Silverstein, "Burma,t" pp. 89-90, 125 . 
14. Tinker, Union, p. 61. The KMT had increased their activities on the 
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tion cannot be held responsible for the 1958 crisis in Ran­
goon, it was a contributing factor. The chief goal of the 
military caretaker government was the suppression of insur­
gents, including the KMT.t15 
As regards Burma'ts foreign policy, the continued pres­
ence of the KMT in the Shan State posed an additional problem
for Burma. China continued its cordial relations with Burma 
and the existence of the KMT seemed to ensure their cooperat­
tion with Burma. In 1954, Premier Chou En-lai assured the 
government of Burma that it had no reason to fear China as 
long as Burma remained neutral.t16  The border treaty that 
Burma and China negotiated was the most difficult problem
the two governments dealt with in the late 1950'ts.t1 7 
In 1955 and 1956, PLA troops entered the Wa State of 
Burma. The border in this area was not clearly defined and 
both the Communist and Nationalist Chinese governments
18claimed territory that Burma contended was Burmese.t Anat­
lysts differ over what motivated the Chinese to enter the Wa 
State. One interpretation is that PLA troops entered Burma 
in pursuit of fleeing KMT troops. The Burmese could not per­
mit the existence of CPR troops within their borders and the 
government protested the incursion. Confronted with the 
Burmese protest , the CPR responded by denying the l�gitimacy 
J
Chinese border during border negotiations then underway between 
Burma and China. Teiwes, "Force and Diplomacy,"t·tp. 212. 
15. Trager, Burma, p. 182. 
16. "Conversation with U Thant . . .  by . . .  Foreign Relations Commit­
tee, " p. 2. 
17. Some KMf's were reported to have deserted their units in Burma and 
returned to Yunnan in 1954. New York Times, January 19, 1954. 
The CPR adopted a policy of rewarding KMT's who returned from 
Burma. Theyt. were greeted in public ceremonies and given land whicht· 
had been set aside for them during land reform. SCMP 1469, p. 24. 
As late as 1959, 82 KMI' s were reported to have returned to Yunnan. 
The CPR directed propaganda to them from across the border. SCMP 
2122, p. 20. 
18. For background see Martin Norins, "The Tribal Boundaries of the 
Burma-Yunnan Frontier," Paaifia Affairs, 12 (1939) ,  pp. 67-79 ; Hugh 
Tinker, " Burma's Northeast Borderland Problems," Paaific Affairs, 
20 (1956) , pp. 324-346; Richard J. Kozicki, "The Sino-Burmese Fron­
tier Problem," Far Eastern Survey, 26 (1961) , pp. 89-90; Maxwell, 
India 's  China War, pp. 210-213; Dorothy Woodman, The Making of 
Modern Burma (London: Cresset, 1962)t. 
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of the "colonial" border. 1 9 Anot'her interpretation is that .
the border crisis was created by the CPR to be used later as 
a model for settling border disputes with India and the 
Soviet Union.t2 0 Whatever the validity of either of these 
analyses, this incident prompted the beginning of negotiat­
tions to settle the border conflict with China by both the 
Nu civilian and Ne Win military governments. 
Meanwhile, the Burma army continued its efforts to rout 
the KMT from the border areat.t2 1  These military efforts may
have been designed to put pressure on the Chinese negotiators
by demonstrating that the Burmese government did coritrol the 
disputed territory. Also, they may have been iniended to 
forestall any KMT efforts to tempt the PLA to cross into 
Burma. On January 2 8 ,  1960, General Ne Win signed the Sino­
Burmese Boundary Agreement which concluded the border nego­
tiations. A Boundary Treaty was signed by U Nu on October 1, 
1960.o2 2  The treaty was favorable to Burma'ts interests.t2 3  
In January, 1961, Chou En-lai with a delegation of 400 
visited Rangoon for seven days. The visit showed the cor­
dial relations that existed between Burma and China.t2 4  The 
following April, U Nu and Chou En-lai met again, this time 
in Yunnant. There they issued a joint communique which re­
affirmed the ' 'tnecessity for Sino-Burmese cooperation in deal­
ing with the KMT remnants still at large in the border re­
gions." An agreement had apparently been reached previously 
which allowed Burma'ts or China's troops to cross the border 
up to ten kilometers in pursuit of the KMT.2 5  
After 1954, the_ governments of Burma and Thailand made 
19. Daphne E. Whittam, "The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty ,"  Pacific 
Affairs, 34 (1961), pp. 89-90. 
20. Teiwes , "Force and Diplomacy ,"  p. 215. 
21. New York Times, March 29 , 195 7 ;  March 31, 1959; May 19, 1959 . 
22. Whittam, "Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty ," pp. 180-181. 
23. See Map 3 in Silverstein, "Burma,"  p. 165. 
24. Bangkok Post, January 3 and 5 ,  1961. 
25. Daniel Wolfstone, "Burma's Honeymoon with China ,"  Far Eastern Eco­
nomic Review, 33 (August 24, 1961), pp. 353-355. Earlier reports 
of such an agreement had been denied by U Nu. Bangkok Post, Decem­
ber 21,  1960. 
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efforts to improve relations with each other .o2 6  After the 
evacouation, many of the KMT in Burma would f lee into Thailand 
when Burmese military pressure on them i ncreased. Those who 
were caughto. in Thai land i n  1954) were reported to have been 
detained and given daily allowances by the Thai government 
until they could be sent to Taiowan.o27 In  August, 195 4, Bur­
mes e officials went to " Bangkok to discuss ways of easing
"o2 8tensions along the Thai-Burmese frontier.o Apparently
their discoussions were fruitful as the border was soon re­
opened at five places and enti rely opened in late November .o2 9  
In January, 1955 , a Thai goodwill mission arrived i n  
Rangoon.o3 0  In February, the Burmese Ambassador and Thai 
police officials met i n  Chiengmai to discuss common border 
problems, especoially the remaioning KMT's in the area.o3 1  In 
the followi ng months, as the Burmese increased thei r mili tary 
efforts against the KMT, the Thai border police strengthened
their border sec uri ty operations.o3 2  
In June, 195 5 ,  as a gesture of friendship, the Burmese 
government agreed to c ompensate Thailand for the death of 
two Thais killed in a Burmese anti-KMT bombing raid of Octo­
ber, 195 3.o3 3  In November, the Thai Economic Affairs Ministry
announced a plan to assist the Burma army in supplying troops
along the common border.o3 4  After returning from a trip to 
Rangoon, Thai Prime Minister Pibul Songgram said that Thai­
land had promised to aid the Burmese against the KMT.o3 5  In 
26. Silverstein, "Burma,t" p. 166. 
27. New York Times, July 4, 1954. 
28. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 43. 
29. Ibid.,  p. 37 ; New York Times, September 2, 1954. 
30. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 49. 
31. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chronology of Interna­
tional Events, 11, p. 166. 
32. New York Times, March 3, 1955. As a result , the Thai border police 
reported that they caught seven fleeing KMT's in early April. This 
was the largest number of KMT ' s  ever caught at one time in Thailand, 
according to the Police. Ibid., April 3, 1955. 
33. Ibid., June 22, 1955. 
34. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 58. 
35. New York Times, December 20,  1955. 
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1 957, Burma and Thailand ratified a treaty of rriendship, and 
negotiations were concluded in September, 1 958, on border 
problems. 3 6 
Despite these friendly exchanges between Thailand and 
Burmat, there remained a basic distrust. In February, 1 956 , 
the government of Burma requested Thai cooperation in ending
the "continued smuggling of U. S.-made arms to the KMT guer­
rillas, "t3 7  but apparently nothing was done. Thai Prime Min­
ister Pibul'ts response to the CPR incursion into the Burmese 
Wa State was not in Burma' s interest. Pibul accused the CPR 
of aggression and suggested that his government would par­·
ticipate in military action against China if the UN requested
it.t3 8 Burma had made no mention of desiring any UN response 
to the PLA incursion. Tensions again increased in 1959 when 
a Burmese plane was reported by the Thai government to have 
strafed and bombed a Thai village killing one and injuring 
five. The Burmese had been attacking rebels on the border.t3 9  
The cooperation the KNDO received in Thailand throughout this 
period must have heightened Burmese suspicions of the Thais. 
When some of the KMT fled Burma they sought refuge in 
Laos as well as in Thailand . Burmese military officers met 
with the General Staff of the Laotian Army in March, 1 955 , 
to discuss their mutual problems with the KMT.t4 0  
The fighting in Laos between the Pathet Lao and the 
U. S.t- supported right-wing forces in 1 960 "produced a sudden 
flourish of Kuomintang military activity in late 1 960, both 
in Burma and in Laos.t"t4 1  There were reports in Rangoon that 
the KMT had established a new headquarters in the border area 
and were being supplied twice a week by air.t4 2  In early 
36. Johnstone, Chronology, pp. 78 ,  93. 
37 . Ibid .o, p. 61. 
38. Ibid., p. 67. 
39. New York Times, June 14, 1959. 
40. Johnstone, Chronology, pp. 52-53. 
41. Clubb, U. S. and Sino-Soviet Bloc , p. 88. 
42. New York Times, October 4, 1960. These flights may also have been 
connected with the fact that "in 1960 and 1961 the CIA recruited 
elements of Nationalist Chinese paramilitary units based in northern 
Thailand to patrol the China-Burma border area . . . t. " McCoy, Poli­
tics of Heroin, p. 265 , citing an interview with Lt. Col. Edward G. 
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April, 1961, the Chinese Nationalist consulate in Vientianet, 
Laos, said 4,t0 0 0  KMT troops had been airlifted from Nam Tha 
to Ban Houie Sai. Arthur Dommen has written that ' 'it appears 
exttremely likely" that this airlift "was closely tied to 
American efforts to persuade the Soviets to cooperate in 
reaching a settlement in Laos.t"t4 3  This increase in KMT ac­
tivity in late 1960 and early 1961 led to a Burmese military 
response which resulted 1n the second KMT crisis.t4 4  
By the late 1950's it had appeared that the KMT no long­
er was a major issue in Burmat' s  foreign and domestic poli­
tics. However, with the renewal of United States' interest 
in using the KMT in Laos, and the renewed drives of the Burma 
army against the KMT, the KMT once more became a center of 
attention. 
Lansdale. It is more likely that t hey were used to "probe" for in­
t ellig ence than " patrol" the border. 
Chiang Kai-shek claimed on Dec emb er 28, 1960, that CPR troops 
had entered northern Burma and that these troops were somehow con­
nect ed with the Pathet Lao. New York Times, Dec ember 29, 1960. The 
government of Burma deni ed t here w ere any CPR troops in Burma. 
Ibid. ,  Dec ember 3 0, 1960. 
43. Arthur J. Oommen, Conflict in Laos : The Polities of Neutraolization 
(New York : Praeg er, 1964), p. 193. 
44. Burma'  s relations with the United States had b een sev er ely strained 
by the first KMT crisis and r emained that way throughout most of the 
1950' s .  The U .S .  Ambassadorship in Rangoon remained vacant for 
eight mont hs after Ambassador S ebald resigned in July, 1954. John­
stone, Chronology, p. 50. U Nu trav eled to the United Stat es in 
1955 as did General N e  Win in 1956. Ibid., pp. 54, 63. They m et 
wit h various civilian and military officials in Washington but 
litt l e  apparently result ed from the talks. The press r eports of 
t heir trips mak e no mention of their having discus s ed t he U . S .  role 
in the KMT int erv ention wit h U .S .  administration officials. 
Economic aid was resumed in the form of t he purchase of Burmes e 
ric e  in Burmese curr ency in 1956 by t he U .S .  The funds deriv ed from 
thes e  sales w ere used to hire t ec hnical advisers for the gov ernment . 
I n  1957 t he Burmese accepted a loan of $ 25 million in U . S .  curr ency 
and $ 17 million in Burmese currency. Silv erst ein, " Burma, "  p. 1 67. 
In  1958 t he two governments signed an agr eement providing for the 
purchase of U .S .  military equipment by  Bunna. Johnstone, Chronology, 
p. 91. It was not until 1959 t hat the Burmese sufficiently  trust ed 
t he motives of t he U .S .  economic aid program t hat they w ere willing 
to acc ept a gift of $37 million. New York Times, July 7, 1959. 
1. 
2. 
CHAPTER V 
THE SECOND KMT CRISIS, FEBRUARY-MARCH, 1961 
Either in response to the increase in KMT activiti es i n  
Laos or the need to protect the joint Burmese- Chinese teams 
surveying the new border, the Burma army launched •�peration 
Mekong" against the KMT in December, 1960o. 1 It inv,plved both 
air and ground attacks on KMT bases. By early January, 1 961o, 
the campaign appeared to have been a success. A number of 
KMT bases and a KMT airfiel d at Mong Pa-liau were captured. 
The KMT's fled into Thailand and Laoso. In Thailand they met 
l ittle resistance from the Thai police and soon began return­
ing to Burma. Three thousand KMT's went to Laos where some 
of them reportedly joined with the troops of General Phou�i 
Nosavoan.o2 
As the KMT's infiltrated back into Burma, the Burma 
army moved against them. By mid-February it was estimated 
that over 4, 000 KMT's were established in eastern Kengtung
State at five bases.o3 It would seem probable that the major 
reason for the KMT's maintai ning their bases in Burma was in 
order to operate in Laos where, as a result of the 1954 
Geneva Accords, there could be no U . S . o-supported bases.o4 
When the Burma army captured the headquarters of KMT General 
Lao Li at Kenglap, they reportedly found "the general atmos­
phere one of American comfort.o" They found ample supplies
of U. S. - made weapons in crates with the U . S .  aid operations
insignia stamped on them.  Included in the reports were 
claims that the KMT possessed weapons as large as 7 5  mm anti­
aircraft guns. At Paliao, another KMT base, the Rangoon
Na tio n reported the KMT'os had left behind "bulldozers, 
Ng Wing Bo , "Exit of the KMT?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 (March 
30, 1961), p .  579; New YoPk Times, January 11, 1961 ;  Nation, January 
12, 1961. Thai officers were sent for liaison with the Burmese troops 
during this anti-KMT campaign. Bangkok Post, December 31 ,  1960. 
Nation, February 8,  1961;  Ng Wing Bo, "Exit of the KMT?" p. 579. 
3. Nation, February 16, 1961. 
4. The author is indebted to Prof. George Kahin for this point. 
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rollers and other heavy equipment.t"t5 The Nation may have 
exaggerated the finds somewhat as the Acting Foreign Minis­
ter, Dr. E Maung, in his report to the legislature on Operat­
tion Mekong, claimed no such finds of heavy equipment.6 
These disclosures nevertheless set off a series of demonstra­
tions in Rangoon, including an attack by students on the 
United States Embassy. When U.tS. military attaches from Ran­
goon visited the KMT base at Mong Pa-liau they reportedly
did not photograph any of the U.tS. equipment made after 1960. 
They also refused to comment on the newer equipment.t7. 
On February 16, the Burma air force shot down a U.S. 
Navy -type PB4Y long-distance patrol bomber which was dropping
supplies to the KMT troops that were fleeing into Thailand 
and Laos. The Burma air force lost one pilot and plane, and 
a second plane was damaged in the encounter. Both the PB4Y 
and the Burma fighter crashed in Thai territory.t8 Burmese 
officials were initially denied permission to inspect the 
crashed plane in Thailand although the wreckage was inspected
by a United States Air Force Lieutenant Colonel.9 The Thai 
government later reported that the PB4Y had been stripped of 
all its markings and the five crewmen were gone by the time 
Thai officials arrived at the crash sight.t1 0  
The Free China Relief Association claimed that it had 
chartered the plane to fly supplies to Chinese refugees in 
the Burma-Thai-China border area.t1 1  From what evidence is 
5. Nation, February 16, 1961. 
6. Ibid . ,  February 28, 1961. The report listed the following captured 
items: 75 rifles, 15 Bren guns, 6 carbines, 1 revolver, 9 81mm and 
60mm mortars, 3 wireless transmitters, a quantity of anti-pers�nnel 
and anti-tank mines, spare wheels for C-46 aircraft, assorted ammu­
nition, 1 jeep, 2 three-ton trucks, military uniforms, 1 generator, 
3 days rations for 5,000 men, buildings to house 2,500 men. 
7 .  Ibid . ,  February 24, 1961. 
8. Ibid.o, February 17, 1961; New York Times, February 17, 1961. The 
plane was initially identified as a B-24. A PB4Y is a B-24 modified 
for Navy use. 
9. Nation, February 17, 1961. 
10. Ibid.o, February 22, 1961. 
1 1. The Free China Relief Association claimed there were 150,t000 Chinese 
refugees ·in the area. It was an organization with very close con­
n�ctions with the Nationalist Chinese government, if not a part of 
the government. New York Times, February 18, 1961. 
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available it seems that the Nat ionalist Chinese were ferry­
i n g U.S. -ma<le arms and equ i.p1nent into Bur1na and Laos for use  
b y  the K1'1'1' . ' l ' l1e Un i ted States, had been supply i ng the Fo rmo­
san government with large quantities of arms throughout the 
1950's. The Burmese found i t  difficult to believe that the 
U.S. government was not at least informed of these operations 
if not involved in them and heldt.tthe United States at least 
indirectly responsible for the matter. 
In early March, the KMT's began returning again to Burma 
and the Thai government reported that all of the KMT troops
had left Thailand.t1 2  The KMT apparently linked up immediate­
ly with various bands of Karen and Shan rebe·ls and recom­
menced their attacks on towns and villages in the border 
1 3area.t
The government of Burma again attempted diplomat i c  as 
well as mili tary methods of solving the KMT problem. The 
government promptly protested to the United States government
the cont inued supply of U.S. arms to the KMT via Nattionali�t  
China.t1 4 Many Burmese believed, as they had in 1953, that 
the U. S. was Chiang Kai- shek's only patron, and if the U.S. 
insisted Chiang stop these operat ions, he would have to com­
ply. 15 Burma also complained to the United Nat ions of the 
continued violation of Burma's terri torial integri ty by 
Nat ionalist China.t16  The Formosan regime denied that i t  was 
sending arms to the KMT but i t  did apologize to Thailand for 
the crash of its plane in Thai terr itory.t1 7  
The new Kennedy administration in Washington responded 
to the Burmese protest by informing Taiwan that i t  opposed 
.the conttinued presence of the KMT's in Burma and Laos, and 
that i t  would assist in removing them. The U.S. government 
also denied it  was supporting the KMT. 1 8  Nat ionalist China· 
replied that i t  would continue i ts relief airdrops to· the 
KMT, although it  would cooperate in any "voluntary"t·tevacua-
12. Ibid., March 5 and March 7, 1961. 
Ibid., March 9 and March 12, 1961. 
14. Ibid., February 18, 1961. 
15. Nation, February 20, 1961. 
16. New York Times, February 23, 1961; Nation, February 23, 1961. 
17. New York Times, February 21 and February 24, 1961. 
18. Ibid., March 3, 1961; Nation, March 5, 1961. 
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tion of the KMT troops.o1 9  It appeared that the cr1 s1 s  was 
going to be a repeat of the 1953 crisis, albeit on a s maller 
scaleo. Na tionalist Chinese official s said most of the KMT's 
refused to leave Burma to go to Taiwan.o2 0  
However, within two weeks of the U.oS. response to the 
Burmese protest, Thai Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat announced 
that an evacuation of the KMT's from Chiengmai in Civil Air 
Transport planes would begin March 17.o2 1  The details of the 
evacuation are not clear·. I t  is not known how many KMT's 
were evacuated to Taiwan or whether they were located in 
Thailand, Laos or Burma. About 4,o000 evacuees is the number 
most often cited in Western sources.o22 
19. New York Times, March 4 and March 7, 1961 .  
20. Of 3, 500 KMI'' s ,  only about one-third were expected to want to be 
evacuated. Nation, March 10 and March 11, 1961. 
21. Officials on Taiwan said the KMT'ts would be flown out in Nationalist 
Chinese planes. Nation, March 17, 1961. 
22. The Nationalist Chinese reported that they had evacuated 4, 211 KMT' s 
by early April, 1961. New York Times, April 6,  1961. The Rangoon 
Nation of March 30 , 1961, said only about 2 , 000 KMf'ts had been re­
moved from Burma by that timet. Perhaps the differences is accounted 
for if 2 , 000 were flown out of Laos. 
On March 14, approximately 1, 200 KMT'ts were seen at Ban Houei 
Sai, on the Mekong River, crossing into Thailand from Laos. Perhaps 
they were going to Chiengmai for evacuationt. Oommen, Conflict in 
Laos, p. 193. A United Press International dispatch of April 12 
stated that the last of 4,000 KMT'ts were being airlifted out of 
Vientiane. New York Times, April 12, 1961. The Nation reported 
that the KMT'ts were being evacuated from two unknown airfieldst. 
Nation, March 30, 1961. Presumably one was Chiengmai and perhaps 
the other was Vientiane. From the available information, there is 
no way of knowing with certainty. 
According to mainland Chinese sources, at least 2,000 KMT 's, 
supplied from Taiwan, continued to fight on the side of the rightist 
forces in Laos after the completion of the second evacuation. They 
were reportedly located in Houi Sai Province and along the northern 
border of Thailand. "Chinese Press Opinion: The Chinese People 
Cannot Remain Indifferent," Peking Review, Vol. V, No. 21 (May 25, 
1962), p .  19. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE CONSEQUE NCES OF THE KMT INTERVE NTION 
FOR BURMA IN THE 1960's 
The second KMT crisis occurred approximately halfway
through the period between the two Ne Win military govern­
ment s.  "Dissatoisfaction among the minorit ies . with control 
from the Burman-dominated center was the single most impor­
tant problem of the 22 months" of this period of civilian 
government.o1 U Nu att empted t o  play down the degree of i n­
surgency in the country. In August, 1961, he estoimated that 
only 7 5 0  KMT' s remained i.n Burina. He said t hat there were 
3, 000 KNDO's, 2, 000 Shan rebels and 1, 500 Communist rebels.o2 
Earlier he predicted that the Shan rebellion would die out 
within a year as the Shan rebels were rio longer receiving 
arms from the KMT.o3 In January, 1962, Nu said that only the 
Shan and Karen rebels posed a threat to the governmento. The 
Communists, KMT' s and Kachin insurgents were n·o longer of· 
4concern.o
Within t wo months of these optimistic statement s, Gen­
eral Ne Win and the army conducted a coup that - removed Nu 
and replaced t he civilian government with a military one. 
While there were other factors mot ivat ing the military,o5 the 
increase in insurgent activity, especially among the Karen 
Nat ional Defense Organization, prompted the military t o  act .o6 
1. Richard Butwell, "The Four Failures of U Nu ' s  Second Premiership,t" 
Asian Survey, 2 (March, 1962), p. 7 .  
2. Nation, August 16, 1961.  
3. Ibid., April 27, 1961. In October Nu said that the insurgency situa­
tion was "not very serious" and that "only pockets of resistance" re­
mainedt. Ibid., October 24, 1961. 
4. Ibid. ,  January 28, 1962. 
5. Butwell, "Four Failures of U Nu' s," p. 2; F. K.  Lehman , "Ethnic Cate­
gories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems,t" in Southeast Asian 
Tribes, Minorities and Nations, ed. by Kunstadter, pp. 94-98. 
6. Trager, Burma, pp . 191-192. 
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Ne Win apparently feared that Nu was going to conocede too 
much to the minorities' demands and allow the disintegration 
of the Union. The demands of Shan and Karen rebels, although
they had had some legitimacy in the eyes of some Burmans be­
fore, now met with much less sympathy, especial ly from the 
military because of the minorities' collusion with the KMT.o7 
Soon after the coup, the army increased its activoities 
against the insurgents.o8 
It cannot be demonostrated that the KMT problem provided 
j ustification for the 1962 coup, but certainly the continued 
support provoided the Shan, Karen and perhaps the Kachin 
rebel s by the KMT, through their arms and training in the 
1950's and early 1960's, was an important contributing fac­
tor. If the army had not had to contend with the KMT in the 
early 1950's, the insurgency problem would have persisted, 
if at all, on a much smaller level. The continual support
of modern U.oS. weapons to the insurgents via Nationalist 
China increased the rebels' · military power v is-a-vis the 
government.  Being strong, the minorities felt they did not 
need to compromise their demands. Prime Minister Nu appeared 
to give in on many points to meet the demands of the minori­
ties. The conciliatoriness on Nu's part appeared to Ne Win 
and the army as giving in to unreasonableness, and they in­
tervened before Nu could conclude his efforts to restore 
domestic peace by granting greater regional autonomy. 
Since the 1962 coup, insurgency among the minorities 
has apparently increased. While the army government was able 
to negotiate a satisfactory solution with some right-wing
KNDO's in 1964,o9 unrest among left-wing Karens and Shans con- . 
1 0tinued.o In 1965 a "Council for National Liberation" was 
founded by not only Karens and Shans opposed to Ne Win but 
also some Mons and Burmans.o1 1  The minorities and disaffected 
Burmans looked to U Nu in the early 197 0's to unite them and 
overthrow Ne Win. 
7. Frank N. Trager, "The Failure of U Nu and the Return of the Armed 
Forces in Burma," Review of Politics, 25 (July, 1963), p. 318. 
8. A KND0 headquarters was captured as was a combined Shan-KMT base at 
Naungplan. Ibid., p. 322. 
9. New York Times, March 14 and April 13, 1964. 
10. Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn, Borderlands (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1962), p. 193; Patterson, "The Shans in Arms," p. 183; The Guardian 
(Manchester), November 3, 1971. 
11. Pa!"ke Fulham, "Burma Guards Her Secrets," Far Eastern Economic Re­
view, 51 (March 3, 1966), p. 404. 
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The KMT are st ill act ive· in the Shan State. While they 
no longer fight for political reasons, they do have an in­
terest in limiting the government ' s control over their areas 
·of opetrat iont. The lucrat ive opium trade thetKMT now conduct _
would be seriously hampered, if not ended, if the government
of Burma could successfully integrate the Shan State into the 
Union . The KMT have an interest in keeping the central gov­
ernment's control of the border regions minimal.t1 2  
Since 196 1, a probable majori ty of the remaining KMT in 
northern Southeast Asia, some of whom by now must. be second 
generation troops, have resided in the Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai 
and Nan provinces of Thailand. The most recent esttimate of 
1 3their number is that they are still 5,500 to 6,000 strong_.t
In a most profitable business, the KMT cross into Burma to .
escort 90 per cent of the opium grown in the Shan State to 
the international drug traders in Bangkok and Saigon.t1 4  As 
a result of the KMT pre�ence in the eastern Shan State the 
central government has been unab+e to control the area effec­
tively, thus permitting CIA-organized intelligente teams to 
cross Burma from Laos into southern China. These act iv i t ies 
continued at least up to President Nixon's visit to China in 
19 71.t1 5  
\ 
12. The author is indebted to 0. E. Clubb, Jr.t, fort·t his point. 
13. New York Times, December 13, 1972. · 
14. McCoy, Politics of Heroin, pp. 246-247, 315. 
15. Ibid.o, p. 334, citing an interview with William Young in Chiengmai, 
Thailand. See also Michael Morrow ' s  Dispatch News Service Interna­
tional report in the American Report, October 2, 1970, p. 3. 
CHAPTER V I I  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to show that the KMT has played 
a role of some magnitude in Burma's political, economic and 
ethnic problems. As long as insurgencies continue, the sta­
bility of the Union will be in question. At crucial points
in contemporary Burmese history, the KMT have provided the 
resources and often the manpower to ensure that the insurrec­
tions would continue. 
The two major political crises of Burmese politicst, the 
military takeovers in 1958 and 1962, are partially the result 
of the government's inability to reach a satisfactory politi­
cal accord with the largest minorities. Efforts of the 
second Ne Win government to solve the problem of insurgency
through military means have not been successful. U Nu, now 
in exile in Thailand, had hoped to use the dissatisfactions 
of various groups to unseat Ne Win and to return to power
with the support of the minorities.t1 
Continued insurgent activities in certain areas of Burma 
have contributed to the problems attendant to the restructur­
ing of the economy in the 1960'ts and 1970's. Instability in 
some areas has resulted in labor shortages and the interrup­
tion of cultivation. Exports of minerals such as wolfram and 
tin have also been limited because of the inability of the 
central government to obtain these minerals located in the 
minority areas.t2 Foreign exchange has also been lost because 
of the smuggling operations in minerals like wolfram and jade. 
The Burmese have been convinced that their neutral for­
eign policy is the primary factor that has allowed them to 
remain independent of the great powers in the Cold War. 
1. Sterling Seagrave, "Report: Burma," Atlantic Monthly, 225, No. 4 
(April, 1970), pp. 32-40. Nu has since "quit the leadership of the 
United National Liberation Front because of his opposition to the 
right of secession demanded by his ethnic minority allies in the 
Front." Richard Butwell, " Burma : The Politics of Survival and Re·­
newal," Current Historry, December, 1972, fn. 1, p. 249. 
2. Fisher, Southeast Asia: A Geography, pp. 454-457. 
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Whether discussing their relations with the People's Republic 
of China or the United States, all the major Burmese leaders 
since independence have said that neutralism has been their 
greatest _tprotection. Since Burma is the only neutral nation 
in Southeast Asia today, they may perhaps take some pride in 
their accomplishment. 
While Burmese neutralism was originally motivated in 
part by the positive goal of maintaining friendly relations 
with all nations, it has become an increasingly negativet· 
policy determined by the Burmese apprehension of losing their 
independence to one of the major powers. Today Burma is one 
of the most isolated countries in the world. The KMT crises 
made apparent to the Burmese the danger of their country be� 
coming a pawn in the U. S. campaign against China and neutral­
ism. Yet a strict neutralist foreign -policy has continued to 
be their best protection � 
• 
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